

Wilmington 1715

Mozal Essays ;

Wherein some of

Mr. LOCKS

A N D

Monfr. *Malbranch's*

Opinions are briefly examin'd.

Together with an

A N S W E R

To some CHAPTERS in the

Oracles of REASON

CONCERNING

D E I S M.

By Ja. Lowde, Rector of Settrington in York-
shire.

YORK, Printed by J White for Fra Hildyard,
and are to be sold by Grab Aylmer at the Three
Pidgeons in Cornhill, and Tho. Bennet at the
Half Moon in St. Pauls Church, London, 1697.

46
12
776.17.



Jo

to
fic
th
ou
th
yo
ve
no

To the Right Honourable,

John *Earl of Bridge-water, Viscount
Brackley, Baron of Ellesmere, Lord
Lieutenant of the County of Bucks,
and one of His Majesties most Honour-
able Privy-Council.*

My Lord,

Titles do not so much
make some Men
great, as show them
to be so ; Gold has an intrin-
sick value in it, even before
the Stamp ; thus the Hon-
ours of your Family, and
the Favours and Smiles of
your Prince, which yet are
very great Happineses, are
not the essential Ingredients

A 2 of

Epistle Dedicatory.

of your more solid and intrinsic Nobility. Vertue and Piety are the great Ornaments and Stability of the Throne it self; nor is it a less Happiness to a Kingdom, when Nobles inherit their Fathers Vertues together with their Fortunes: Thus should I have look'd upon that long Train of Vertues, which your Lordship takes more pleasure in practising, than in having them recounted, almost as hereditary to you, if thereby I might not seem to lessen your personal Title to 'em; and I hope you will give others leave to

ex-

Epistle Dedicatory.

express what they are so intimately sensible of, the great Benefit and Advantage they receive by such benigne Influences.

My Lord,

I shall not here attempt any thing by way even of your Lordships just Character, because the greatness thereof, and your own native averſeness from all such Panegyricks, do wholly discourage me herein, so that this will be the peculiar Character of this Epistle Dedicatory, that it comes as far short of the real worth of its Patron, as others *usually* exceed it.

Only

Epistle Dedicatory.

Only your Lordship must pardon me and others, if in this declining state of Religion and Piety in the World, we call in the Aids and Assistan-ces of such Examples as are able, not only to recommend the practice of Vertue to others, but also to render it, even Honourable in the midst of a perverse Age.

But I am afraid that I am injurious to the Publick, whilst I thus employ *your* precious Minutes; if perhaps *you* vouchsafe to give this short Address the reading. I shall now *only* take this Opportunity, *gratefully* to acknowledge
those

Epistle Dedicatory.

those *many* Favours, which by the long Experience of *many* Years, I have received from you; it is to Your Lordship and Noble *Family*, that I owe these *happy* Retirements, wherein I shall not be wanting to this part of *my Duty*, to *pray* for *your* long Health and Happiness, and that God would long continue *your* Lordship to us, a great Example of all Virtues, and a great instrument of publick and private Good. This is, and shall be the constant Prayer of,

My Lord, your Lordships
most obliged, and most
obedient Servant,

Ja. Lowde.

THE P R E F A C E.

Prefaces are now grown so customary, that Readers generally think themselves neglected without 'em, otherwise I should not have concerned my self herein, the subject matter of these Papers not affording any great occasion for such an Address. I hope thou wilt not impute it to any pragmatical conceitedness, if I thus fill up some vacant Minutes, not wholly taken up in the employment of a Country Cure, with such Meditations as these.

Besides, the Civility of Mr. Locks Answer on the one Hand, and the concerns of Truth on the other, did in a great measure, call for some suitable Reply; I did not indeed, for some time, think the Controversie betwixt him and me, considerable enough to trouble either him or my self with these disputes, (and some perhaps may think so still) but so it happen'd, that a friend of mine lately ask'd me, whether I was really satisfied and convinc'd with what Mr. Lock had writ in his Preface in answer to my former Treatise, I told him I was not; whereupon he reply'd, that then Mr. Lock had taught me in his late Controversie with the learned Bishop of Worcester,

The Preface to the Reader.

ster, that good manners requir'd me to acknowledge the honour he did me, in taking notice of what I formely writ, and that I was bound in Civility to represent the Reasons why I cannot bring my Sentiments wholly to agree with his; for it seems a piece of sullenness and disrespect to remain dissatisfied, and not acquaint those from whom they may most reasonably expect information why they are so.

And further, when I consider'd that several others, viz. J. S. and Mr. Becconsfall had variously disputed those little Controversies betwixt Mr. Lock and me, I humbly conceived I might be allow'd more fully to explain my Sense and Meaning therein, and then leave the whole with the judicious and impartial Reader, where it must rest at last.

Another design of these Papers is to shew the weakness of the Pretences, and the inconclusiveness of the Deists Arguments; I mean such as they themselves have of late made use of in their own Defence, and I have the rather chosen to answer some of those short Letters in the Oracles of Reason, both because I hope this may be done without any great tediousness to the Reader, and also because this is not liable to any of those Objections, that the dry method of the Scholastick Ob. and Sol. (as it is sometimes call'd) is liable unto.

The Deists here plead their own cause, and
if

The Preface to the Reader.

if it prove not so strong as was expected, they have no Body to blame but themselves for it, and if they think it has suffer'd by any personal failures, they may at their own pleasure employ better Advocates.

I do not here pretend to advance any new Notions, but only with as much strength and clearness as I can to defend the old, and therefore I know what I here write, is not like to meet with any general good reception in such a curious Age as this, only I hope there may be some in the World who will not think the worse of Truth because it is gray headed, Truth being always of the elder House; for though Antiquity has not been so successful in finding out Hypotheses of Natural Philosophy, yet I think it has been more happy in settling Morality upon its true Foundations: I am not for venerable Nonsense being prefer'd before new Sense, nor yet am I for venerable Sense being slighted in respect of new Nonsense, it is the greatest instance of folly imaginable, to run out of one extream into another, and though the former Ages have been too much led by Authority, and addicted to antient Errors, yet it will not hence follow, that all new Notions are true.

I am apt to believe, that some Opinions now prevailing in the World owe their reception therein to the positiveness of their Patrons, and

The Preface to the Reader.

to the silence of those of the contrary persuasion, rather than to any strength of Reason that would be found in 'em, were they duly examin'd, there are some whose Notions are so intricate and their expressions so much out of the common Road, that many times they do facere intelligendo, ut alij saltem nihil intelligant: what I here design, therefore in these Papers is clearness and perspicuity; for however deep the pit might be wherein the Ancients plac'd Truth, yet I never heard that it was muddy, so that what is said of the method of Salvation by the Gospel, Rom. 10. 8. may be apply'd generally to all things of a moral Nature, the word is nigh thee, even in thy Mouth, and in thine Heart.

The learned and judicious Author of the Occasional Papers, Paper 1. Pa. 4. tells us, that it would be of great Service both to Religion and good Manners, to have ill Books as they are publish'd, consider'd calmly by Men of Temper. I would only propound it further to Consideration, whether it might not be convenient also somewhat to enlarge the design, and not only take notice of ill Books as he calls them, such as either directly, or by natural and easie consequence tend to undermine our Faith, or corrupt our Manners; not only I say to take notice of such, but also of the more material mistakes, even of good ones, the
best

The Preface to the Reader.

best and wisest Men may sometimes be mistaken in their principles or deductions from them, and it is no disparagement for any one to acknowledge it.

There is one thing further wherein I must beg thy pardon; these Discourses want one great ornament of all Compoſures (Essays themselves not being excepted) that is, my transitions are not so soft and well connected as they ought to be; this I am very sensible of, what the Reason hereof may be, I know not, whether it be my want of Skill, which I rather think, nobis non licet esse tam disertis, or want of leisure, my other employments not suffering me to apply my Self to these thoughts, but at certain intervals, or my natural (but I confess, very culpable) indifferency both as to Style and Method; however it is, if this be any satisfaction to thee, I do willingly acknowledge my fault herein.

Nor must thou expect full and just Discourses upon Each of those Points I here mention, neither my Ability nor Inclination concurring herein fully to exhaust a Subject.

I have no other end or design in these Papers, but only the search and defence of Truth, and if in any thing I be mistaken, (and who can secure himself from mistakes) I shall think my self oblig'd to any one, who shall with candour and calmness show me my Error.

Mr.

*Mr. Lock's Epistle to the Reader
examin'd, so far as concernes the
Law of fashion and innate no-
tions in his second Edition of his
Essay of humane underst-
anding.*

WHAT benefit or advantage, as to the
concernes of truth and usefull
knowledge, the World may receive
by that little difference in Dispute betwixt
Mr. *Lock* and me, I know not, yet herein I
hope, we have given an instance of the possi-
bility of manageing a controversie without
hard words, or unhansome Reflections; and
if even this was more generally observed, it
would very much advance the interest of truth,
however of Love and Friendship in the World
among persons of different Opinions. I do
not in the least question the truth and sin-
cerity of what he there professes, that he is
always ready to renounce his own and receive
the opinion of others, according as truth ap-
pears on either side; yet I hope he will par-
don me, if I take the freedom to say, that the

Instance he there gives of altering of his opinion in reference to the last determination of the will of Man, doth not seem to come up so fully to his purpose, seeing he doth not there so much quit any Opinion of his own to embrace that of anothers, as to renounce the common opinion of most, tho then believed by him to entertain an Opinion, I think, purely his own.

Mr. *Lock* there complains, that his meaning is often *mistaken*, and that he has not *always the good Luck to be rightly understood*: This is a common complaint in such circumstances, and I think, I may also lay a just claime to a share therein, but if I have mistaken his meaning in any thing, whatever the cause might otherwise be, I do insist upon this in my own vindication, that it was not out of any wilful designe: And I further assure that Learned Man, that I never did think my self, nor went about to insinuate to others, that it was my Opinion of him, that he absolutely held no reall difference or distinction betwixt Vice and Vertue: I did only ask this question there, *Whether if Men should place their commendation or blame on that side which deserv'd it not, whether that would alter the nature of things?* This I conceiv'd, might either set the thing in a clearer light in it self, or give him occasion so to do. I there also farther appeal'd

peal'd to himself Pa. 17. of his 1st. Edition, where I suppose he did not only declare the sense of the Heathen *Phylosophers*, but his own too upon this Subject, when he grounds the reason of Mens keeping their word, not upon the approbation of the place, Men live in, *But upon the honesty and dignity of the thing it self.*

I did also read and consider those other places, where he doth positively assert the unchangeable Rules of right and wrong, only I must confess, I did much wonder how so Learned a Man should go so near, as I thought to contradict himself in other places, where his expressions seem'd, at least, to me then, to infer the the Rules of Vice and Vertue to be of a more changeable Nature, particularly in that place I quoted Pa. 159. *Virtue is every where that which is thought praise-worthy, and nothing else but that which has the allowance of publique esteem, is vertue.*

But instead of *is Virtue*, in the 1st. Edition, it is now *is called Vertue*, in the Second, therefore, I suppose, he say's *That the 2d. Edition will give me satisfaction in the point, and that this matter is now so express'd, as to show, there was no cause of scruple.* It may be so exprest now perhaps that there is no cause of scruple (tho that I much question) but it will not follow hence, that there was

none, but rather the contrary, because he has alter'd his Expression in such a materiall point.

But he tells us, *That he was there, not laying down morall Rules, but showing the Original and nature of morall Ideas.* For my part I dare scarce trust my own eyes against his word; I shall here quote part of the Paragraph, which he here refers to, P.157. § 6. *Of these moral Rules or Laws, to which Men generally refer, and which they judge of the rectitude or pravity of their actions, there seeme to me to be three sorts.* Here he seemes to me to call 'em morall Rules, but whether he meanes the same thing by morall Rules here, that he meanes in his *Epistle*, that he himself is best able to resolve. *Vid, Mr. Beconsfall, P. 199. 200. &c.* But I must confess, that if I was mistaken in any thing, it was in what he tells us immediately after; that in that place I there quoted, (and if so, then by consequence in all those other places, which in the same Chapter may seem liable to the same exception) *That he only reported as matter of fact, what others call Vertue and Vice, &c.*

I shall therefore here briefly lay down the reasons, why I did not so apprehend him, and then leave it to Mr. *Lock's* own candour to pass judgment.

I shall not need, to Premise, that it is only

ly the 1st. Edition of his Book, that I am concern'd in, without taking notice of any alterations, or explications he has made in his 2^d. my discourse being writ, before his 2^d. Edition was Printed, and therefore, 1st. Besides what I have already mentioned, there are some other passages in that Chapter, wherein he seemes to speak his own opinion rather then mere matter, of fact what others call *vice or virtue* 158. P. §. 7. *By the relation our actions bear to the Divine Law, Wee judge, whether they be sins or dutys, by the 2^d. The Civil Law, whether they be criminall or innocent. By the 3^d. By the Philosophicall Law, whether they be Virtues or Vices.* So P. 160. §. 14. There having resolved the complex Idea, we signifie by the word *Murther*, into its simple Ideas, he proceeds, *this Collection of simple Ideas being found by me to agree or disagree, with the esteem of the Country, I have been bred in, and to be held by most Men there, worthy praise or blame; I call the action vertuous or vicious.* Now I had thought that *Wee and I*, especially being joyned with such Words as these, *Wee judge and I call* together with this expression found by me, had included a Mans selfe (Chap. of Identity §. 20.)

*Urbem, quam dicunt Romam Melibæe, putavi,
Stultus Ego, hunc nostræ similem.*

Truly I imagin'd that, in things of this nature, Men had generally spoken after the same manner all *England* over.

About the Year 1284. There were some Grammaticall heresies, that is, some false Latin and false Grammer condemn'd, by Arch Episcopal Authority, such as these, *Ego currit, nullum nomen est tertiæ personæ*. far be it from me to impute any such Sollæcismes to this Learned Author ; however I think, that I had very good reason to apply these expressions to the 1st. Person, rather than to any third. 2^{ly}. 'Tis observeable that he pleads for this 3^d. Law, and that with all the force of reason, perhaps, that the thing is capable of, now when Men relate things, as mere matter of fact, what others either do or say, they usually leave 'em to stand or fall by their own evidence ; I question whether ever any did so much towards the giving Mens actings according to custome or opinion, the formality and grandeur of a Law before, and as for the sanction, with all the Elaborate circumstances he has annex to it, I think it is perfectly his own. P. 159. 160. §. 12. But I must beg leave here to say that the most Hetrodox writer (*absit verbo invidia*) might perhaps thus take upon him only the same character of a Relator, after he had used and urged all the Arguments that either
reason

reason or Authority could afford him for his particular opinion.

I do not here say he so far pleaded for this Law of custom or opinion, as to make it the standing Rule of Vice or Vertue truly so call'd, or of right and wrong, as he some times calls 'em, but only that he espous'd the cause and pleaded for that Law further than the thing would well bear. And these are the reasons that did more especially induce me to think, that he did not there take upon him the bare Office of a Relator.

To which I might also add, if it was necessary, what he says. P. 159. §. 12. If any one shall imagin that I have ~~forgett~~ my own notion of a Law, when I *make the Law whereby Men judge of Vertue and Vice, to be nothing else, but consent of private Men, &c.* This is not spoken like one, who barely relates matter of fact: Others indeed may, and that justly too, act in obedience to that rule of decency and common repute, yet I think he was one of the first that *made it a Law*, especially such, where by Men judge of *Vertue and Vice*.

I shall only add one or two considerations more upon this Subject, before I leave it.

1st. It seemes a peculiar way of speaking, not yet grown common in the World, when he assigns the Names of *vice* and *vertue* to

such actions, as are agreeable or disagreeable to common reputation, and for that reason, because they are so, whereas it always was, and still is the more usual way, not only of judging what things are in their own nature, but also of denominating actions *vertuous* or *vicious* rather from their agreeableness or disagreeableness to the dictates of reason, and the law of Nature, rather than from the custom of the Place. I grant indeed, that what ever is truly vertuous, is generally counted laudable, but it is not therefore vertuous, because laudable, but therefore laudable because vertuous.

NOW I think that neither Names, nor the grounds and reasons of 'em ought more to be alter'd, than the Ancient Landmarks in Publick Fields, ought to be remov'd; for nothing but disorder, confusion and needless disputes will arise from both.

I cannot pretend to be acquainted with all the perticular Modes of speaking throughout the World, yet I much question, whether this be the most common and general acceptance of that word *Vertue*, that it is taken most commonly for those actions, which according to the different opinions of several Countrys are accounted laudable. pag. 23. § 18. or however, not under that formality, because they were so counted. I do not here dispute concerning

cerning the true and proper acceptation of the word *Vertue*, as Mr. *Lock* has rightly stated it in the very next period, but only as to matter of fact, even what apprehensions other Nations generally had of it.

I grant indeed that we shall sometimes find different practices in different places about the same thing, and all abounding in their own sense and pleading for the fitness and decency of their own perticular way: Thus some thought it the most Decent and Honourable way of burying their Dead by eating of 'em, others by Burning, others by Enterring, and no doubt all thought their own Method the best: But these are matters of indifferency, and so do not strictly come up to our present case, but however it may be further ask'd whether or no these several sorts of People did count themselves only *Vertuous* herein, and all the rest *Vicious*.

Quakers are very rude and uncivil in *Thouing* People, as we call it, especially those that are not of their own Club, but I wish they had no greater *Vices* to answer for than this. I have heard of a King that was both blind and Lame, whereupon it was grown in fashion, and a laudable custom in that Court, not to appear but with one Eye cover'd, and with some counterfeiting at least a lameness. These

were indeed very complaisant Courtiers, but why they should be call'd *Vertuous* for their dissimulation I know not, nor whether they were accounted so, even in that Place, where the thing was grown so fashionable,

Thieves live in good Repute and Credit among themselves, and no doubt applaud their own Exploits in their own Clubs, but yet I much question whether they think violence and rapine to be *Vertues* or no, or do indeed call 'em so. They may perhaps employ their wits and fancy's to excuse their way of living, but not to justify it, nor to raise it to a degree of Vertue; or if we should suppose one among the rest more modest in his apprehensions and not retain such Heroick thoughts of Theft and Murder as the others did, yet I fancy his Life would not be so uneasie to him as Mr. *Locks* Sanction would seem to make it. *pa.* 159. I scarce think that any Christian Nation (and the Christian World is a Scene large enough for this dispute) doth call that a *vertue*, which either is in it self, or by any other Christian Nation is called a *vice*. Whoredome, tho' in some Countries permitted and but too much in fashion, yet it is not even there call'd a *vertue*, tho' perhaps it may be counted a lesser *vice*. And why should we here in *England* begin to unhinge and unsettle the signification of words, especially such

whole

whose sense and meaning always was and still ought to be more fix'd and constant.

2. this Law of Opinion and Reputation, as it is made to Constitute a distinct Law, is not well grounded, for a Law is always suppos'd to bring men under an obligation, now the things in fashion among men, if they be contrary to the Law of Nature, let mens opinions of 'em be what they will, yet they are no Law to any one, and if they be agreeable to the Law of Nature, then they do so far *coincidere* with the Divine Law, and do not constitute a new Species of Law.

But I must remember what Mr. *Lock* reminds me of, that he only relates what others say, not what he defends. But if so, then I can mention several other rules, which men sometimes make Lawes to themselves, *viz.* their respective tempers and humours, and the prejudices of Education: which are as much Laws to these men in their respective Clubs, as opinion and reputation are to others in theirs.

But he goes on, *whatsoever Authority, he says, I place in my old English Dictionary, it no where tells me, that the same action is not in credit, call'd and reputed a vertue in one place, which being in disrepute passes for and under the name of vice in another.* But with submission I must tell him, that whatever Authority he places

places in his new way of speaking, yet, tho' our English Dictionarys (his as well as mine) no where say, that the same actions are not variously reputed, so or so in various places (for that is not their business) yet they no where say, that they are. For both our Dictionarys and Moral Philosophers (I appeal to both) tell us, that vice and vertue are much what the same with good and evil, sin and duty, and by consequence, that they did not, at least in those times so much as receive their denomination from Custom, but if he had instanc'd in one perticular action in the whole Christian World, which in one Place was counted a vertue, and in another a vice, it would have added much light to the whole, and better explain'd his meaning.

The taking notice that Men bestow the names of vertue and vice, according to the rule of reputation, is all I have done, or can be laid to my charge to have done, towards the making of vice vertue, and vertue vice.

Here I would only ask whether this, of Mens bestowing the names of vertue and vice, according to the rule of reputation, be in it self a just well grounded and reasonable action, if it be, why doth he not assert and defend it, if it be not, why doth he found a Law *vis. of opinion and reputation*, upon the unwarrantable and ill grounded actions of Men.

But

But he seemes to commend me, (upon what account I know not) for *taking the alarm*, as he calls it, *even at expressions, which standing alone by themselves might sound ill and be suspected* I know not what he means by *expressions standing alone by themselves*. I hope he will grant, that several expressions, standing alone by themselves, that is at certain distances, yet all upon the same account justly exceptionable, may be taken notice of; and I suppose he now understands, that it was not only one single expression, dropt as it were by chance from his Pen, that I found fault with but with his whole way of arguing upon that perticular.

'Tis to this zeal, allowable in his Function,

Some think this to be a reflection upon my Function, as if its proper business was to be employ'd in impertinencies, but I am willing, according to my Function, to put the most favourable interpretation upon things that they are capable of bearing, *that I forgive his Citing my words, as he there does, &c.* 'Tis my happiness, that I find, that some Men, as they are great, so they are also merciful. I also thank him for the respect he seems to show to the Function, but Zeal without knowledge (as he must suppose mine to be, for otherwise I should never have found fault, where there was no ground for it) is no more

more pardonable in my Function, than in others, perhaps less. But no one they say refuses Gods and the Kings Pardon. I will go a little further, and not only accept, but humbly beg his Pardon too if I be in the wrong, but I hope I may *contestari litem*. He blames me for not taking notice of those words immediately preceding those of his, *The exhortation of inspired Teachers, &c.* But it was not much material to my Purpose, nor any way Prejudicial to his Cause, whether I did or no, as I hope will appear in the Sequel. He also blames me for quoting that Place of St. Paul, *Phil. 4. 8. Whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report, if there be any vertue, if there be any Praise, &c.* In a sense he us'd it not. Truly I am not yet convinced, that I quoted it in any other sense, than the Apostle spoke it, and if he us'd it in any other, I cannot tell how to help it, he must look to that, but he says, he brought this passage of St. Paul, to show that for reasons he there gives, Men in that way of denominating their actions, do not for the most part much vary from the Law of Nature, which is that standing and unalterable rule, by which they ought, &c.

I am of his opinion too in this perticular, viz. that in so doing, they do not for the most part much vary from, &c.

And

And yet not for this reason because St. Paul says *whatsoever things are of good report, if there be any vertue, if there be any praise, think of these things.* For indeed St. Paul here supposes some things either in themselves of good report, or in their own natures indifferent, and by the Innocent and laudable custom of that place made so, and then they are the subject matter of a Command, *think of these things*: but then by bare mentioning things of good report, he does not concern himself in that question, howfar Men in denominating their actions according to common repute, may or may not vary from the Law of Nature:

Tho' by the way it seems but a very humble commendation of this Law of opinion or reputation, which is attended with all these diminutions, *That it is such as (only) for the most part doth not much vary from the Law of Nature.* That is, it may sometimes, nay frequently too, and in some degree vary from it.

But St. Paul, being an inspired Teacher, certainly would not appeal to common repute under those Formalitys and disadvantageous circumstances, seeing he was there laying down Rules for the guidance of all succeeding Ages of the Church So that the *things of good report*, which the Apostle appeals to, were such, as did not only for the *most part*,
but

but alwayes agree with the Law of Nature, or at least were not contrary to it.

The *Exhortations of Inspired Teachers have not feared to appeal to common-repute, &c.* By this must be understood such an appeal, as refers to Practice, *think of these things*; now I durst appeal to Mr, *Lock* himself whether the Apostle would exhort Men to the practice of things of good report, without any restriction or limitation; since he himself doth acknowledge that Men, in denominating their actions according to this Law, do (only) *For the most part not much vary from the Law of nature. Whereby, even in the Corruption of manners, the true Boundarys of the Law of nature, which ought to be the Rule of Vertue and Vice, were pretty well preserved.*

These are the Words, upon account of which he blam'd me, because I did omit 'em; but doth he indeed think, that the Apostle in this case would have appealed to such a state of things without exception, wherein the true Boundarys of the Law of Nature were, (only) *pretty well preserv'd.* Tis granted on all hands, that the Law of Nature ought indeed to be the Rule of vertue and vice; but it seems it is not always actually so: If this be not the meaning of that expression *pretty well preserved*, I know not

not what is. And what advantage is this to his cause? I hope Mr. *Lock* is not one of those, who would here tell us, that the rule, which the Apostle here layes down, is not absolutely certain and infallible, but only such, as for the most part, and more generally is true: For this would ill comport with the Character of an *Inspired Teacher*:

Nor do I see, what tolerable Sense can be made of these words, *If there be any vertue, If there be any prayse*, Or why they are introduc'd, according to Mr. *Lock's* way of interpreting the Place.

I have insisted the longer upon this Subject, and represented my thoughts the more variously, that if possible I might the more certainly hit the Authors meaning, for I must confess, that such is either the obscurity of his Expression, or of his way of Arguing here, or such the dulness of my capacity, that I cannot be assured, that I fully apprehend his meaning in this perticular.

But then as to Naturall notions, he says, we are better agreed than I thought of; if so, I am glad of it, for I can assure him, I take no pleasure in having any difference with any one: But I am afraid, there will, upon examination, be found some small difference betwixt us, in this particular also.

In stating the Question, he says, *I leave nothing in it contrary to what he had said.* I shall here first Transcribe my stating of it, so far as is necessary in this perticular, that so the Reader may be the better able to judge betwixt us. P. 52. *These Naturall notions, are not so Imprinted upon our Soules, as that they naturally and necessarily exert themselves (even in Children and Ideots) without any assistance from the outward Senses, or without the help of some previous cultivation, for thus reason it self, which yet, we say, is natural to a Man is not so born with him, but that it requires some Supervenient assistances, before it arrive at the true exercise of it self, and it is as much as I here contend for, if these notions be in the same sence connaturall to the Soul, as Reason it self is.*

And farther, the use of our understanding being First supposed that is, our faculties laboring of no naturall defect, nor deprived of those other advantages, that God and Nature have made necessary there unto, then our Soules have a natural power of finding, or framing such principles or propositions, the truth or knowledge whereof no wayes depends upon the evidence of sence or observation. And now doth Mr. Lock indeed say, that these notions are in the same sence Connatural to the Soul, as reason it self is? Doth he indeed grant
to

to our Souls a native power of finding or frameing such principles or propositions, the truth or knowledge whereof no ways depends upon the Evidence of sense or Observation? and yet, methinks he must grant this too, if he hold to his *intuitive certainty*; and if so then we are better agreed, than I thought of: But then what becomes of that pompous principle, that sensation and reflexions upon sensible Impressions, are the Originals of all our knowledge; but he proceeds, *All that he says for innate, imprinted or inpress'd notions (for of innate idea's he says nothing at all) amounts only &c.* Here he seemes to blame me for not speaking of innate ideas. But 1st. What reason had I to enter upon any such discourse, seeing that neither he believes any such, nor do I Universally assert 'em, nor did my subject naturally lead me hereunto. For I cannot be convinc'd of the force of his argument P. 27. That if there be innate notions, that then there must be innate idea's. I doe indeed assert innate notions, in the sense before explain'd, but yet I do not say, that all the respective ideas, *viz.* simple ideas relating to those notions are innate: I shall only instance in one or two, *Cogito, ergo sum*, bare nothing cannot produce any real Being. P. 312. *Of his Essay*, of these Mr. Lock says, he

he has an intuitiue *knowledge or certainty*, and yet I do not believe, that there are any innate ideas of *Cogitation, Existence, Production, nothing, &c.* The respective ideas, that these notions are composed of.

2. I had no mind to ingage in a discourse of that nature, because I looked upon the Doctrine of ideas, as it is now generally mannag'd, to be a very intricate, and perhaps not altogether such an usefull speculation.

The old way of resolving knowledge, was into these three operations of the mind, 1st. Simple apprehension. 2^d. Composition and Division. 3^d. Discourse from both the former. Now if this ideal Scheme, with all its various Divisions, and Sub-divisions, be either the same, or do in a great measure *concidere* with the former, why should the World be amused, either with making new Words, or using Old ones in a new Signification. I know Mr. *Lock* tells us, P. 73. § 4. *That it is unavoidable in Discourses differing from the ordinary received notions, either to make new Words, or use Old ones, in somewhat a new signification.* But then such Men ought to consider, whether the Notions, which appear different from the Ordinary received ones, do not in a great measure owe their extraordinariness, if I may so speak, rather

ther to the Authors expressing them in new words, or words of a new signification, rather than to any newness in the notion it self.

Nor do I see how this way of resolving knowledge into these ideas conveyed into our minds, by *Sensation and Reflexion there upon*, doth any way more effectually tend to the reall advancement of usefull knowledge, than the other, for it rather supposes us already to have attain'd to that knowledge, which we thus resolve into these ideas, than to enable us to make any further advances in it.

Thus I have a generall notion of a *Book* for example; at the first sight, now if I should resolve this notion into its ideall principles, into all its simple ideas, &c. I believe I should at last have no better notion or idea of it than I had before.

I shall only instance in another of his own P, 160. §. 14. For example, *Let us consider, the complex idea we signify by the word, Murder, and when we have taken it asunder, and examin'd all the particulars, we shall find them to amount to a Collection of simple ideas, derived from sensation or reflection. First, from Reflection on the operation of our own minds, we have the ideas of willing, considering, purposing before-hand malice, or wishing ill to another*

another, and also of life or perception and self motion. 2ly. From Sensation, we have the Collection of the simple sensible ideas of a Man, and of some action by which we put an end to that perception and motion in the Man; all which simple ideas are comprehended in the word Murther. I suppose, he design'd here more particularly to explain to us the nature of Murther, according to his ideall way, by sensation and reflection. Now if we should thus explain the Word or go about to instruct an honest Country-Jury-man in the nature of the thing, *Viz.* Of Murther, he would certainly stare at us, and perhaps think that we were not much overgrown, either with Law or Reason; but never understand the nature of Murther one jot the better for it. I never yet observ'd that *Lushington's Logick*, which is either a new way of thinking or a new way of expressing old thoughts ever made that improvement of knowledge in the World, which the Author at first perhaps promised himself it would do.

P. 44. §. 24. *The impressions then that are made upon our selves by outward Objects, that are extrinsecall to the mind, and its own operations about these impressions reflected on by its self, as proper Objects to be contemplated by it, are, I conceive the original of all knowledge. Here tis observeable, that the reflection is made upon*

upon the operations of the mind, as employed and exercised about these outward impressions, now one might have thought, that the streames would not have risen above the Fountains head, and that the reflections upon these outward impressions would not have produc'd ideas of a quite different nature from the rest. So that that which Mr. Norris. P. 61. Of his remarks upon the *Athenian Society*, puts upon these ideas, seemes to be the most naturall and obvious sense and meaning of 'em, *Viz. That these ideas of reflection are but a secondary sort of ideas, that result from the various compositions, and modifications of these primary ones of sensation.* Otherwise this notion of his, which he seems to advance with some kind of pompous traine of thought, as if something out of the common road of former methods, will, at last dwindle into this, which hath been the common and generall opinion of all the considering part of Mankind herein, that all knowledge proceeds either from the senses, or from the understanding, in its most extensive capacity, however qualified and disposed for that purpose. But by reflection among other things he includes the power of *negation*: Thus from conception of *some thing* by negation hereof he forms an idea of *nothing*: But now methinks we are got far
 aboue

about the sphere of sensation, for *nothing* cannot be the object of sense, nor make any impression upon the outward organs, and yet the Soul can frame propositions of as great truth and evidence from this *nothing*; as it can from *something* Ex. gr. *bare nothing* cannot produce a *reall being*, but to proceed.

He sayes that I *make innate notions conditionall things depending upon the concurrence of severall other circumstances, in order to the Souls exerting them*; and so leave *nothing in the stating of the Question, contrary to what he had said before*. But I shall quit the place, upon which he grounds this, and then leave it to the Reader to judge, whether he hath done me right or no, P. 78. Of my former discourse. I was there complaining of some Men who will put such a sense upon these Words, *innate or naturall, as if a thing cou'd not be thus naturall or innate to the Soul, unless it did so immediately and necessarily stare Children and Fools in the face, that they must necessarily assent thereto, even before, by the common course of nature, they are capable of assenting to any thing*; whereas those who defend this *Question, make these naturall or innate notions more conditionall things, depending on the concurrence of severall other circumstances, &c.* Now I appeal to the Reader, whether these notions may not be more conditionall things,

OR

or not such absolute ones, as necessarily to stare Children or Fools in the Face, and yet not such as Mr. *Lock* makes 'em, and yet not such as owe their origionall to sensation, or reflection upon sensible impressions. But he says, that all I say for innate notions amounts only to this, *that there are certain propositions, which tho the Soul, from the beginning, or when a Man is born, does not know, yet by assistance from the outward senses, and the help of some previous cultivation, it may afterward come certainly to know the truth of.*

1st. I do not say that Infants have that actuall knowledge of these propositions, any more than they have the actuall exercise of reason ; Yet by assistance from the outward senses, &c. Here I cannot but take notice, how industriously he endeavours to fix his own sense upon my Words, tho' indeed they will not bear it ; but certainly here must be some mistake, either in him or me, as to this particular, for in the stating of the Question, I said ; *that the truth and knowledge of these propositions did no way depend upon the evidence of sense or observation*, therefore methinks, I should not presently say, that by the assistance of the outward senses we afterward come to the certain knowledge of them, in the same sense wherein he seems to intimate it : But what if I never said any such

C

thing

thing at all, or what I said will not amount to any such sense, as he put there upon it? He might have done well to have quoted the place, then might we better have examined the sense and meaning of it: But I think those expressions (nor any thing like 'em) do no where occur in my Book, what comes the nearest is P. 52. I shall transcribe the Words, and let the Reader judge: *These naturall notions are not so imprinted upon the Soul, as that they naturally, and necessarily exert themselves (even in Children and ideots) without any assistance from the outward senses, or without the help of some previous cultivation: For thus reason it self, which yet we say, is naturall to a Man is not so born with him; but that it requires, &c.* I do not understand, that there is any such thing asserted in this place, as that which he seemes to make my meaning in the former: But I shall have occasion to examine this place again, upon the like account.

But he seemes not to like that expression of the Soules exerting of notions, as being a very unintelligible and unfit one in this case, misleading Mens thoughts by an insinuation as if those notions were in the mind, before the Soul exerts 'em.

But I have already told him, that I do not say, that these notions are in the mind from the

the beginning, any other ways than reason it self is ; and if I did, (as Mr. Norris very pertinently asks the question) *How does the Author know, but that These naturall impressions, may be so ordred, that they shall not become legible before such a period of time,* I know not how he would confute it.

2d. I was there defending innate notions, and he opposing 'em, it was his part therefore to prove my assertion false, but when he barely finds fault with this expression of the Souls exerting of notions, as if it mist-ed Mens thoughts, &c. This is only to suppose it false, but not to prove it so.

He further seems to charge me with some contrariety or inconsistency of expression. P. 52. There he charges me with saying, that *these naturall notions exert themselves as* P. 78. *That the Soul exerts 'em.*

As to the 1st. P. 52. That these notions exert themselves: Truly in that place, I say no such thing, but rather the contrary, my Words are these; *These natural notions are not so imprinted upon the Soul, as that they naturally and necessarily exert themselves (even in Children and idiots)*

Here we may observe, that the period is negative, and the negative particle exerts its influence, if I may so speak, upon the whole sentence: But however,, I say, *They doe not*

exert themselves without any assistance from, &c. Which supposes that with such assistances, they do exert themselves, but this perhaps is the only instance, wherein Mr. *Lock* doth not seem to deal so ingeniously with me, *Viz.* To charge me with an inconsistency or impropriety of speech only by *implication*; but suppose one, who asserts innate notions should say sometimes, *that they exert themselves*, sometimes, *that the Soul exerts 'em*, I think it would not be any such great inconsistency, unless Men would be too severely criticall, yet this I say, that these naturall notions may require or suppose some assistance from the outward senses or some previous cultivation, and yet *the truth and Knowledge of 'em, not depend upon the evidences of sense or observation* any more than intuitive knowledge doth. But he would have me to explain to my self or others what I mean by the Souls exerting these notions, and what that previous cultivation, or those other circumstances in order to their being exerted, are.

1. By the Souls exerting them as it is an act or operation of the Soul, I mean the same that I do by all other its acts or operations, only the Soul here acts upon different motives and principles, and upon different occasions, *ex. gr.* When the Soul exerts this
no-

notion or proposition, *Snow is white*, the truth of this she has from sense or experience, but in this, *nihili nullæ sunt affectiones*, there she acts in a more abstracted way of speculation, without any notices or assistances, *immediatly* drawn from the senses: And this I conceive, is the way of his *intuitive certainty*. If he says, that this is what he meanes by his *sensation and reflection*, I am very glad of it, and shall no ways oppose him.

And then as to what I mean by that *previous cultivation, or those other circumstances*, &c. He may observe, that I always introduce these expressions with relation or respect to Children going before. And so it was P. 52. and 78. So that by that previous cultivation or other circumstances I mean all the previous discipline the Child underwent at School, or elsewhere, all the benefits and advantages of Education, which are commonly requisite in order to reasons coming to a competent exercise of it self.

So that, if I should say, that the Soul being so, and so qualify'd exerts those notions, so, as to suppose some footsteps of these truths imprinted or interwoven in the very essentiall constitution of the Soul, as such that is, as rational, I think it an assertion

not unreasonable in it self, however not possible to be disprov'd, or confuted by any one.

Tho' this is not my way of asserting innate Notions, *viz.* intellectual Notions, exclusively of the other, which I shall here subjoyn.

Therefore, *2dly.* If I say that these Notions are of such a frame or bear such a natural or necessary agreement to the facultys of our Soules, in the free use and exercise of 'em that they cannot but assent to 'em, when fairly propos'd.

I think this is much what the same with the former, especially if we consider, that I do not here suppose the intermediation of any Notices or Ideas drawn from sense, in the act of producing them, any more than in any act of reason, or Speculation whatsoever.

Now if either of these two ways (if perhaps they be different) prove teneable, then I shall be able to maintain my ground, for in stating the question, I did not confine my self to either of 'em particularly, for I said that supposing the Soul so and so quallify'd, *it then has a native power of finding or framing such Principles or propositions, the truth or knowledge whereof no ways depends upon the evidence of sense, or observation.*

I have hitherto been upon the explaining Part, in observance of his demand, I hope he will now give me leave to desire him to explain some things in his assertions, which seem not so easy and obvious to apprehend.

Pa. 318. *The knowledge of our own being we have by Intuition; the Existence of a God, reason clearly makes known to us, the knowledge of the existence of other things, we can have only by sensation*, here he assigns 3 several ways of acquiring Knowledge, and in the same Pa. he says, *the notice we have by our senses of the existence of things without us, tho' it be not altogether so certain as our intuitive knowledge, or the deductions of our reason &c.*

Pa. 312, *Man knows by an intuitive knowledge that bare nothing cannot produce any real being.* Now intuitive knowledge was never suppos'd to be acquir'd by sensation, or by any reflexion upon materiall impressions, and indeed here he himself acknowledges the same.

Now that which I would desire him to explain to himself or others is,

1. How this intuitive Knowledge thus asserted is reconcileable with what he says Pa. 44 & 24, where sensation and reflexion are made the Originals of all Knowledge.

2. I would desire him to explain how any

impressions from outward objects, or any operations of the mind about these impressions reflected on by it self, can produce in Man any knowledge or sense of Moral good or evil or of the difference betwixt them; I know he tells us that supposing a God, and such a creature as Man is, from the relation that one bears to the other, honour will necessarily be due to God, from Man. I grant this, but I do not see, how he can come to this knowledge from any sensible impressions from without, or by reflexions of the mind hereupon.

When he has a little more fully explain'd these things, I suppose there will be very little difference betwixt him and me in this particular, and that he will, in some measure be forc'd to acknowledge with me. *Pa. 53. that the Soul, the free use of our understandings first suppos'd, has a native power of finding, or framing such Propositions the truth, or knowledge whereof no way depends upon the evidence of sense, or observation.*

But I must remember that what that Learned Man writ, was only by way of Essay, and I would desire the Reader to look upon what I write too here, in the same manner: Only I think, that an Essay, like a Town or Fortrefs once attempted or besieg'd ought
either

either to be well defended or fairly given up, and thus much in Answer to Mr. *Lock*.

I shall here further take notice of a Cavil of the Atheists, who make it an Objection against the being of a God, that they do not discover him without any application, in spite of their corrupt wills and debauch't understandings; if such a God (say they) as we are told of, had Created and Form'd us, surely he would have left upon our minds a native and indelible inscription of himself, whereby we must need have felt him, even without seeking, and believ'd in him, whether we would or no.

I shall first consider this as a mere Cavil of the Atheists, tho' as it is manag'd by some, it seems rather to be made use of as an Argument against the natural impression of God upon our minds, than any proof against his being.

And here we may observe.

I. That if the confession of Atheists will add any thing to the Cause in hand, they themselves do grant, that it was a thing reasonable and becoming, that God should leave some Natural Character of himself upon the Souls of Men, but the unreasonableness of the Cavil consists not in the impression it self, but in the suppos'd indelibleness and Irresistibility of it, but I

hope we shall be able to account for that by and by.

2. Atheists themselves are sometimes forc'd, more especially at their Death, to acknowledge a God whether they will or no, and this is a fair probable Argument at least of this natural inscription; 'tis true, God may more *immediately* work such effects upon Mens mind, but his ordinary and regular way of acting is by means, *viz.* by restoring Conscience to its Natural freedom, which before was debauch'd and blinded by bad Principles and worse Practices; these Natural notions of good and evil, and the sense of our Obligation hereunto, being now more at liberty, and their consciences more freely excusing or accusing them, tho' I do not here exclude the influences of Gods Holy Spirit.

But 'tis here Reply'd, that God has endued Mankind with powers and abilities of Natural light and reason, by which he cannot miss of the discovery of a God, and this is sufficient, and therefore such an Original impression would not be necessary. But what if there be other Arguments to prove the being of a God, must we then reject this as useless? Suppose an Atheistical Person should object against such a particular Epistle or Chapter in Holy Writ, that it is
not

not Canonical Scripture, must we therefore give up the Point, because perhaps there is Scripture sufficient to Salvation without it?

But they say, that such an impression would have rendred the belief of a God irresistible and necessary, and thereby bereav'd it of all that is good and acceptable in it. But how do they prove, that this impression would make the belief of a God irresistible and necessary? may there not be such an impression upon our minds, as may rather gently incline, than forcibly constrain to belief? May it not be such, as that the power and efficacy of it may be, in a great measure rebated by wilful wickedness and vicious Practices? May there not be such a thing as Divine Grace, tho' at the same time we do not believe it to be irresistible? But they tell us that such a radical truth *that God is*, and springing up with the very Essence of our Souls, is not pretended to by Religion. But doth Religion pretend any thing to the contrary? But supposing (which yet will not be easily granted) that the Scripture doth not either suppose or assert this naturall inscription or signature of God upon our minds; yet doth Religion forbid us to make use of any Argument

ment that may be piously or rationally credible, for the proof of a God?

Scripture doth not go about to prove the being of God by Philosophicall arguments, this was not the design of *Moses*, or the Prophets, or the Apostles, any other ways, than as the History of the one, and the Prophecies and Miracles of the others do sufficiently demonstrate it; and therefore tis no argument against such a Naturall impression or idea of God; because the Scripture doth not particularly insist upon it, for that purpose. The Scripture doth argue as strongly, as any the most accute Phylosopher can do, but then it is rather to prove the attributes, than the being of God; this is rather supposed, than gon about to be prov'd in Scripture.

But then I would only aske these opposers of this Naturall character of God upon our mindes, whether they do grant any Naturall notions of good or evil; if they do, I know not why they should deny this of God, upon which the other do depend: If they do not, they then must make morality a more Mechanicall and Factitious thing than God and Nature ever design'd to make it.

So that I humbly conceive, that these Men, whilst they thus goe about to answer the
the

the Cavill, do indeed rather cut, than lose the knot, by granting the truth of this consequence, that if God hath made any original impression of himself upon the minds of Men; then it must be necessary and irresistible as to the producing such and such effects upon all Men, and at all times: For by this meanes they lay a necessity upon themselves of denying any such thing, as this naturall Character or idea of God, whereas they might sufficiently have answered this Cavill of the Atheists, by granting the being of such a naturall impression, and by denying the consequence, that then it must be irresistible, in the sense they assert it; and I beleeve it would require more wit, then the Atheist either is, or ever will be master of, to prove it.

Addenda

Addenda to the former Chapter, Concerning the Law of Custom, and Innate notions.

MR. *Lock* in his Preface says, he was in the Chapter there mentioned, not laying down morall Rules, *but enumerating the Rules Men made use of in morall relations, whether those Rules were true or false* but certainly it is not so well consistent with that great Character that Mr. *Lock* beares in the World, to spend time in laying down Rules in things relating to morality, without any respect to their being either true or false, considering the bad use the vulgar and inconsiderate People may, and frequently do make of such doubtfull discourses; Men may thus write for ever, and yet the World never the better, but possibly much worse for their Writeing: But the Rules he there takes notice of are these three: 1st. The Divine Law. 2^d. Humane Law. 3^{ly}. The Law of Opinion, or Reputation. Now the Divine Law is always true, Humane Law always Obligatory, but the Law of Fashion or Opinion, which

which is neither always true. nor always Obligatory, seemes to be very unjustly joynd with the two former.

But I must doe Mr. *Lock* that right, as to take notice of what he says in the last §. of that Chapter. There he tells us, *that tho' the Rule be erronious, and I mistaken in it, yet the agreemeent or disagreement of that, which I compare with it, is evidently known by me; wherein consists my knowledge of relation:* But what an insignificant piece of knowledge is this, thus to know Relation, for when I see a Pedler measuring me off so much Stuffe by a false Yard, I see indeed the relation, that one bears to the other, and that agreement betwixt 'em but what satisfaction is that to me, for the Cheat that is put upon me by the false measurer. *But tho' measuring by a wrong Rule I shall thereby be brought to judge amiss of it's morall rectitude, because I have tryed it by that, which is not the true rule, &c.* Here Mr. *Lock* confesses that morall rectitude consists in the truth of the rule, not in the agreement of any action to a rule, whether that rule be true or false. Now let us compare such or such an action to the Law or Rule of Fashion or reputation; I find it agreeable thereunto: What then follows? Why, then it follows, that it is agreeable thereunto; nothing further can follow

follow hence, because as yet I know not whether that Law of Custome or reputation be true or no.

So that Mr. *Lock* here seems to make use of his own authority in a great measure to repeal that Law of Custom or fashion, which in the former part of that *Chap.* he seems to enact.

But now in his Preface he says, he never endeavour'd to make it a Law; if so, then what meanes the 12th. §. Wherein he seems to assume to himself the honour of making it such, and further adds a Sanction thereunto, I think perfectly of his own Elaboration: Tho' indeed the Sanction doth not seem to stand good, even upon his own principles. For §. 5. He tells us, *that moral good and evil is the conformity or disagreement of our voluntary actions to some Law, whereby good and evil is drawn on us from the will and power of the Law-maker, and by the Decree of the Law maker.* Now I suppose no particular Society or Club of Men ever met together to constitute such respective sanctions to actions agreeable or disagreeable to Fashion or Reputation; for he tells us. §. 10. That *this approbation or dislike, doth by a secret and tacit consent,* (which certainly is some thing different from the will, power and Decree of the Law-maker) *establish it self in the severall*
alt

Societies, and Clubs of Men in the World:
 And §. 6. *It would be in vain for one intelligent being to set a rule to the action of another, if he had it not in his power to reward or punish the compliance with, or deviation from this Rule, by some good and evil, that is not the natural product, and consequence of the action it self, for that being a naturall convenience or inconvenience, would operate of it self without a Law.* Now if an action be truly morally good, praise and approbation is the natural product and consequence of such an action; and if it be really bad, then blame and censure; but now these do not come up to the rewards and punishments above mentioned, such as are extrinick to the nature of the action, and not the natural and necessary results of it.

But Mr. *Becconsfall* hath in a great measure prevented me on this Subject, for which I thank him.

But *J.S.P.* 271. p. 199. 200. Of his reflections upon Mr. *Lock*, there speaking of this little Controversy betwixt Mr. *Lock* and me, says, that Mr. *Lock* has so perfectly clear'd that point in his Preface that none can now remain unsatisf'd, for who can hinder Men from fancying and nameing things, as they list. none indeed can hinder Men from doing thus, but this they ought not to do, unless they

they think and Write without any respect either to truth or goodness, and when *Men fancy and name things, as they list*, if this be done without any ground of reason, and contrary to the generall practice of Mankind, I humbly conceive, there is no reason, that this should satisfy any one: But then *pa. 274.* He says, *I think it had been better and more unexceptionable, to have called such good and bad dispositions (Reputed vertues and vices) than to joyne those qualities in an univocall appellation, &c.* Here he seemes to cast the Cause on my side againe: But we are all partys here, and so must appeal to the impartiall and juditious Reader, the only supreme Judge in things of this nature,

Here tis very well worth the Observation, what the Learned Bp. of Worcester says, *pa. 25.* Of his Answer to Mr. Locks *2d. Letter.* *I am utterly against any private Miuts of Words, and I think those Persons assume too much Authority to themselves, who will not suffer common words to pass in their generall acceptation, but will set such Bounds and Limits to 'em, as suit best with their own speculations.*

And here I cannot but take notice of a certain kind of novell affected way of speaking of late prevailing in the World, even
among

among great Phylosophers, whether it be to gratify their own curiosity of speaking, or that they pretend to advance some new notion by this new way of expressing themselves, I know not; but this is certain, that vicious and ill minded Men do make use hereof, especially when tis apply'd to matters of Morality, to worse purposes, than our modern Philosophers probably ever intended it.

Mr. Malbranch, pa. 15. Paragraph, 7. Of his late Treatise of Morality, It is certain *that universall reason is always the same, order is immutable, and yet morality changes according to places and times.* Bad Men from such instances, as these, take occasion to undermine the very Fundamentals of all Religion, and wholly to resolve morality into mere custome and Education. Mr. Lock indeed did say, in his 1st. Edition of his Essay, that *nothing else but that which has the allowance of publick esteem, is vertue.* But he altred it in his 2^d. and probably Mr. Malbranch if he have the same candor and ingenuity, will doe the same too. Mens apprehensions concerning some points of Morality may vary and alter, but the things themselves never do. *It is a vertue, he says, among the Germans to drink hard.* But this is ~~is~~ an assertion both false and scandalous, for

for who ever said that the personal failures of private Persons can make that a vertue any where which is not so in it self, neither do I think, that this of Drinking hard, I suppose, he meanes to excess, is generally counted a vertue, even in *Germany*: Thus some Men stick not to violate all the Rules of order, truth and justice, only to advance a notion false in it self, and dangerous in its consequences, *Viz.* That Morality changes according to times and places.

Vice and Errour are of a Progressive nature, thus Men first live as if there were no God, then they wish there was none, then they set their understandings to defend, what their Vicious and Corrupt affections first prompted them to desire: Thus from Atheisme in practise they proceed to Atheisme in speculation. So also some Men speak, as if there were no fixt and standing rules of morality; others, being prompted thereunto by their vicious humours, take the hint, and hence boldly assert that there are no such things; thus taking away the very foundation of all natural Religion.

I shall here beg leave to reflect upon one or two passages more in his Treatise *Pa. 414. De inquirenda veritate.* He tells us, that God has instituted a Natural Union betwixt
the

the will of Man and the representation of Idea's. But now in the 5th. Chapt. of his Treatise of Morality, being conscious perhaps that the Will of Man will not so well do the business, he now shuffles betwixt *Mans will and his attention*, as if these two were the same thing. In the heads of that 5th. chap. we find this, *our desires are the occasional causes of our Knowledge*. But in the 2d. Paragr: he tells us that God by a general Law hath annexed the presence of Idea's to the attention of our mind, and some few lines after, *having an inward sense of his own attention and no knowledge of the operation of God he looks upon the endeavour of his desires*, as the true cause of those Ideas, that accompany that endeavour, What he means by the *endeavour of his desires*, we shall know, when his Illustrations come out: I suppose he does not make Mens desires and their endeavours the same thing, only because Men desires commonly put 'em upon endeavours. But Parag: 4th. he tells us, *that attention of the mind then is a kind of natural Prayer*, he might as well have said that Prayer is a kind of Natural attention, and so made *quidlibet ex quolibet*, merely to avoid a frank acknowledgment of his former error.

In the beginning of his 2d. Chapt. he says,
the

the *love of order* is not only the chief of moral Vertues, but the only virtue, and thro' that whole *Chapt.* and in other places he speaks very great things of this love of order, as if there was no other virtue besides it, and yet *Ch. 3d. Paragr: 1st.* tho' I have not express'd the Principal or Mother Vertue by the Authentick name of Charity, I would not have any one imagine that I pretend to deliver to Men any other Vertue, than that which Christ himself hath establish'd in these words, *Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, &c. on these two depend the Law and the Prophets.* Mat. 22. 37, 40. 1 Cor. 13. 1. But then why did he not retain the same name, that our Saviour and his Apostles made use of, does he think that the *love of order* expresses it better? Or is not this something of the humour before taken notice of, viz. an affected way of speaking. By the *love of order* then he only means a true inward principle of all vertuous actions, and if so, then it is so far from being the *only Vertue*, that it is not one, that is, compleat, entire, perfect virtue of it self, there are other things requir'd to the compleating of virtue besides a right principle tho' perhaps this is the first and principal ingredient; *bonum ex causa integra, malum ex quolibet defectu*, so that a disposition or facility of performing such

such dutys is not properly vertue, without the love of order : Pa. 15. neither is the mere love of order properly a vertue, without the performing such duty's when we have ability and opportunity of performing 'em.

Then as to Innate Notions I would add,

That I take these (especially Intellectual Notions) to be call'd so, rather in opposition to their being the result of mere sense and observation or of any mere reflexions on sensible impressions, rather than that they are imprinted from the beginning upon the Soul in any such gross Characters, as some perhaps may imagine them; tho' I do not here recal any thing, that I had said before upon that Subject.

We seem to have as clear a Notion of the thing, when we say, *nihili nullæ sunt affectiones*, as we have, when we are told Pa. 139 of Mr. Locks Letter to the Bishop of Worcester? that the Idea of nothing has a necessary connexion with no power, no operation, no causality, no effect, that is, with nothing. This proposition indeed, nothing has a necessary connexion with nothing, is certainly true; but then it seems to border too near upon those Propositions, which add no light to the understanding which bring no

encrease to our knowledg, that is, trifling Propositions. Pa. 307. of Essay. Mr. Norris blames Mr. Lock, because he has not given us a just and real definition of an Idea, and may not Mr. Lock blame Mr. Norris his definition Pa. 30 of his reflexions upon Mr. Lock's Essay, when he tells us that an *Idea is a partial representation of the Divine omniformity, or the omniform Essence of God, partially represented*, either as in it selfe unintelligible, or as not so agreeable to the honour and dignity of the Divine Essence.

I could have wish'd, that Mr. Lock had further explain'd, what relation those operations of the mind, which he calls Ideas of reflexion, have to the precedent impressions made upon the sense Pa. 44. § 24. That seems to suppose sensible impressions alwayes to preceed the reflexions of the mind. But on the other hand, Intuitive knowledge, viz. of the existence of our Souls doth neither suppose, nor is it self any operation of the mind about any sensible impressions going before.

Mr. Lock charg'd me with some kind of a inconsistency of expression in one place saying, *that the Soul exerted those notions*, in one another, *that they exerted themselves*: But tis a great sign, that matter and Argument run low, when Men thus meanly carp at words:

I hope

I hope I have sufficiently vindicated my self, as to that particular ; but if I should follow the example of so great a Master, and be thus severely critical, it perhaps would be difficult for himself to avoid the like censures. *pa.* 323. of his Essay, §. 14. 1st. Edit. *Knowledge is the consequence of the ideas, that are in our minds, what ever they are, and produce generall certain propositions.* I dare not be over-confident that I rightly understand the period, but if this be the sense of it, which seemes to be so, that the ideas produce these generall certain propositions, I humbly conceive it the more proper way of speaking, to say, that the Soul by the aids and assistance of these ideas produce, those propositions, than that the ideas themselves should do it. I do not speak this as if there was here any just occasion of exception, but only to show, how easily men may be ill natur'd, if they pleas'd.

I am sorry I have not the concurrence of Mr. *Becconsall's* opinion in this point too of innate notions, I shall therefore briefly examine some passages of his, relating to this subject, first I do not well understand, why he should grant the Law of nature to be innate, or implanted in the minds of Men, as he tells us, *Pa.* 2d. That *the Gentiles had a Law of action implanted in*
D the

the very frame and Constitution of their Natures.
 and Pa. 6. *The Law of Nature is implanted in the minds of Men, as rationall beings:* And yet at the same time to reject the Doctrine of innate inscriptions, as he calls 'em. Pa. 75. Whereas I humbly conceive, that the Law of Nature is either the same with these naturall inscriptions, or innate notions, or the one so Founded, in the other, that they must both stand, or fall together, if by being implanted in the minds of Men, he mean only a power or faculty in the Soul of collecting those truths by rational disquisitions, then I think, he has not done right neither to himself, nor his Reader by so expressing it.

But he says, Pa. 75. *that the frame, and order of things both within, and without us, with the exercise of our own facultys upon 'em will present us with a Scheme of moral duty, and a true measure of action, and that too as clearly, as if it was imprinted upon the mind, with the first lineaments of its being.* I do not deny the great use, and advantage of our naturall faculties, in order to that end, that is, to those whose circumstances are such, that they have abilities, and opportunities to employ 'em so, that is, Christians may possibly do it, but a great part of the Gentile world cannot.

But

But how does he prove, that this Scheme of duty will thus be *as clearly* presented to us, as if it was imprinted with the First lineaments of our beings: This seemes to be barely asserted without proof: Whereas the contrary seemes more probable, that the double evidence of natural inscription and Rationall deduction would add to the cleareness of the thing.

And therefore he says, *There seemes to be no visible necessity for haveing recourse to innate ideas, or inscriptions.* Those who assert innate inscriptions justly suppose themselves on the defensive part, and they who write against 'em can challenge no other, than that of opponents. Now barely to plead the no necessity of a thing is no necessary argument against him, who positively asserts the matter of fact, that it is so, for many things may be, and are so, of which perhaps there is no necessity, that they should be so: And this seemes sufficient to abate the force of the Argument; If nothing further could be added; for what if God has given us greater assistances, than perhaps were absolutely necessary; in a thing of so great concernment; we have no reason to take it ill.

But then why may we not assert, if not a necessity, yet a great conveniency of these

naturall notions, viz. In respect of that part of the Gentile world, who have neither ability nor inclination to make such profound disquisitions into the nature of Man, and the reason of things, as are necessary to attain to the naturall knowledge of duty: And if Mr. *Becconsfall* had more fully consider'd the Barbarous state of the greatest part of the Heathen World, tis probable he would have found 'em subjects not capable of such rati-onall enquiry's, as his way of Arguing supposes 'em. But he goes on,

If innate ideas be serviceable to Mankind, they must be so in order to supply the defects of reason, and consequently they seem to be exempt from the disquisitions of reason. These natural notions of truth, and goodness are some of the greatest strokes, wherein consists the Image of God, imprinted upon the minds of Men, in order to make them what they are, rational and Religious; now if this Learned Author, or any else call this a supplying the defects of Reason, I shall not much oppose it; only I should rather call 'em the fundamental principles of all Reasoning: *And consequently they seem to be exempt from the disquisitions of Reason.* I do not understand the necessity of this consequence at all, for how can these things be fit and proper aids to supply the de-

defects of reason, if they themselves cannot, or dare not undergoe the most exact trialls and disquisitions of reason.

He gives his reason in the following words. *For if innate ideas, are to be examined and judged on by the working of reason,* What then? We might have imagin'd, that the inference from hence would have been, either 1st. That then there are no such things as these Native Inscriptions, or 2^{ly}. That they are not serviceable in order to supply the defects of reason, or 3^{ly}. That they were exempt from the disquisitions of reason, but its none of these, but only this, *Then reason it self will answer all the ends and designs of a reasonable being:* But if it does, this seemes only to extend to the Christian World; reason does but very indifferently perform this among the Heathens. But he says, *It does it as effectually, as if a digest of Laws were originally recorded on the mind.* But how doth he prove, that the Heathens may not thank those Native impressions, that they are not sunk lower into Barbarisme than indeed they are: or supposing, that they did enjoy a greater and freer use of reason, than I am afraid they do, yet how doth he prove, that they owe the light of truth and obligation to duty merely to their rationall en-

quirys in contradistinction to, or seperation from these innate notions, or not rather to the benign influence that these later (however in conjunction with the former) have upon them. But *pa. 76.* He says, *That the Doctrine of innate ideas must be laid aside, since we cannot conceive, that a wise Creator should establish any ordinance without some special ends, and use annex'd to it, I mean such, as are not served any other way.* But to this I answer, *1st.* That what he there supposes, is not yet sufficiently demonstrated, *viz.* That Men generally may as well come to the knowledge of their Duty, by such rational enquirys, as they may by these native inscriptions. *2ly.* How doth he prove, that it is inconsistent with the wisdom of Divine providence to appoint the joint concurrence of two things, as in this case, naturall inscription and rational deduction, as meanes in order to the same end, they mutually supporting, defending, and confirming each other.

Pa. 77. In a word then, tho' the sacred language seems to favour the notion of native inscriptions, yet it may be justly resolved into metaphor and figure, &c, But it is some advantage to the notion, that the sacred Language favours it, especially since the assertors thereof are defenders of that Text, and found their

their opinion upon it: And therefore 'tis not sufficient for him to say, that the Sacred Language may be resolved into a Metaphor, but he must prove, that it must necessarily be so interpreted; and here the assertors of these Inscriptions may more justly say, that the Text *may* be understood in the plain, obvious, and literal sense of the words, therefore there is no need, no occasion of a Metaphor.

I do not here speak any thing to derogate from the excellency, and usefulness of those powers, and facultys that God has endued us with in order to discover a rule of action, yet I can scarce be perswaded, that the mere exercise of reason in those circumstances of time, and place before mentioned, will do it *as clearly and as effectually*, as if a digest of Laws were originally recorded on the mind, tho' I do not say that any such digest is thus recorded, only some of the primary, original and fundamental Laws of Nature, or some greater strokes thereof are originally communicated to the Soul, yet in a way suteable to the nature of the things thus communicated, and to the nature of the Soul, the Subject of 'em.

But here if I may speak my own private conjecture, I think, these rational enquiries

quirys by the use of our facultys may better serve the designs of truth, than they can those of goodness, and be more available for the founding of intellectual, and notional, rather then Moral, and practical Principles upon.

Pa. 75. He says, that if it be allow'd, that *probabilitys may determine our judgments in this matter, the doctrine of innate Ideas is rather to be rejected, than retain'd.*

But if probabilitys will avail any thing, I doubt not but the Doctrine of innate Ideas has its probabilitys too, as 1. Since this Doctrine of native Ideas or inscriptions (he means the same by both) is not matter of mere indifferency, but has a very useful influence both upon natural and Reveal'd Religion, is it not therefore the more probable to be true? And further, Is it probable that the Apostle, Ro. 2. 15. would positively and plainly say that *this Law of Nature was written upon the hearts of the Gentiles*, if it really and truly was not so? 2. Is it probable, that God would leave the Gentile World to the guidance of that reason, which in their circumstances, could not be any tolerable direction to 'em, either in the ways of truth or holyness, without some other (at least more probable, means

means) to keep em, if possible, from sinking too much below themselves? 3d. This is the most that can be said against the Doctrine of Innate Ideas, or natural inscripſion, that there is no need, they say, of having recourse hereunto, reason it self sufficiently serving for those purposes without it : Now this is such an argument, as may perhaps be urg'd with equal force against all the Moral (that is, no small) part of the Gospel ; for may not, nay, do not some Men say, that there was no need of any such Revelation, reason it self, they say, had done that without it.

But perhaps it may seem too much a receding from the Divine Authority of Scripture, to plead that over again by probabilitys, which 'tis granted on all hands, is favour'd by plain expressions of Scripture.

But Mr. *Beconſal* in his *Chapt.* of Parental love, and affection : Pa 122. speaking of the lower Order of Creatures, says, *they, as well as we, must conclude, that Parental Love is the effect of some peculiar propension, wove in with the Frame, and Constitution of our beings.* and Pa. 126. *For a Man to love and cherish his Offspring is certainly the result of an inward Propension.* Now I do not know, that the assertors of Innate Principles do understand any thing more by them, then what is

here granted: 'Tis true indeed, it follows, but the exercise of it from the consideration of the close affinity it bears to his own flesh and blood, is a work of reason. But is it the less Innate, because it is also rational? Or may not a Man actually love his Child out of that inward propension so to do, tho' at the same time he doth not consider that affinity it bears to his own flesh, and blood?

But the ground, and reason of the difference betwixt Mr. *Beconsal* and me in this particular seems to be this, *Pa.* 74. that he thinks the Doctrine of Innate Ideas, or practical Principles serves not any real purposes of Religion, and I think it does.

Mr. *Lock*, in his Reply to what I had said concerning Innate Notions, employs the most of his discourse upon that, which is least considerable, he skirmishes about the outworks, but never enters into the merits of the cause, nor comes to dispute that which was most material in the Controversy.

I wonder why he should lay so much stress upon Children, and Fools, and debauch'd Persons, to make their assent or dissent so available one way, or other: I am no friend to Dogmatizing, yet I humbly conceive, that no one has any just reason to think

think the worse of any Opinion merely because such Persons do not assent unto it.

Neither do they who plead for this general consent, make it so universal, as to include every particular.

Ps. 24. §. 20. *I desire these Men to say, whether by Education, and Custom these Notions can or cannot be blurr'd and blotted out.* Since he is so Positive in his demand, why may not we be as positive in our answer, and say that they can: And what then? Why, then truly he drops that part of the disjunction and only says; *If they may suffer variation by adventitious Notions* (which is a very gentle way of blotting out) but what then follows? Why then *we must find them clearest, and most perspicuous, nearest the Fountain, in Children, &c.* We must, he says, but he never yet prov'd the necessity of that consequence: And then as for Illiterate Persons, if he mean, plain, honest illiterate Heathens, such as are less Learned, but less corrupted by false Principles and wicked Practises I doubt not, but these Notions will appear clearer in such: But however we still remain in the full and undisturb'd possession of that side of the disjunction, that these notions may by bad Custom, and Education be blotted out, which ground thus gain'd will be of great disadvantage to his cause.

As

As for what he says, Pa. 18. of the wicked Practices, and Atheistical Opinions of some Heathen Nations, some think that his Authors were not so exact in their observations, as they might have been, but suppose they were, it makes nothing to the advantage of his cause, unless he had prov'd before, that these Notions cannot be blotted out of the minds of Men.

Neither will it follow hence, that they are of no use to Mankind, if they may be thus defac'd. For, 1st. It may be in some measure owing to these, that all the Nations of the Heathen World are not sunk lower into wickedness than indeed they are. 2^{dly}. 'Tis probable these Innate Notions will be instrumental in the Conviction and Conversion of these People, when God in the wisdom of his Providence, shall think fit to do it; and I doubt not but the Apostles in their Preaching did appeal to these, and make use of 'em, for this purpose. Rom. 2. 14, 15.

Pa. 21. §. 14. Here speaking of these Moral Rules, he is very urgent with us, to tell, which they are; if he means, that we should give the exact determinate number of 'em, I think this is a very unreasonable demand, however I shall at present instance in those, which Mr. Nye mentions Pa. 21. of
his

His naturall Religion. 1st. A tenderness for and care of our Children. 2^d. A commiseration of the oppressions and wants of such, as are distressed, and not by their own fault, but thro' mishap, or the iniquity of others. 3^d. A propensity to favour worthy Persons and actions; And here, I would only give him this caution, that in his reply, he do not draw his Answer and Arguments from Children, and Fools; for such Evidence will be excepted against; nor from such as by Vicious customes have blotted these notions out of their minds; for no one thinks the worse of the Belief of a God, because the whole Club of professed Atheists deny it.

Here give me leave to add one thing further, tho' out of its proper place, as for those that assert these innate notions I know not how they can well otherwise express it, than by saying, that the Soul upon occasion exerts em, and as for that other way of exerting themselves, if it wanted any defence, I have very good authority for it, Mr. Lock, P. 13. of his Essay.

§ 27. 'Tis a great presumption that these generall maxims are not innate, since they are best known to those, in whom, if they were

were innate, they must needs *emerge themselves*, with most force and vigour.

That there is a reall, and unalterable distinction betwixt good, and evil, is a very great, and important truth, and such as ought to be fixt upon the best and surest foundations, but I cannot think, Mr. Beconsfalls Argument *pa.* 194. so cogent, as the nature of the thing requires,

Moral good, he says, always includes a naturall good, and naturall good is evidently establish'd in the frame of created nature, and consequently, if the frame of nature be unalterable, moral good must be so too.

Here, if by moral good always including a naturall good, he meanes, that moral good is always attended with some real advantage naturally accruing from the practice of it, this I grant, is generally true, but then may we not say here, as he says of pleasure, *pa.* 188. In respect of Natural good, that it seems to be a consequence, rather then a measure, and constituent principle of morall good, so this natural good, which, he says, is always included in morall good, seems to be the consequence, rather then the measure, and constituent principle of moral good: But then if he makes moral good only a part of,

as indeed he seems to make it the same with, naturall good, (only distinguish'd by the accession of a free choice, *pa.* 186.) and so included in the frame of created nature, this will only prove, that moral good is what God at first Creation made it, and so not in the highest Sense, eternal and immutable, as depending merely upon Gods free and Arbitrary will, and positive determination, and thus this Learned Author will fall in with *P. Poiretts* opinion in this particular. *vide.* former discourse of *humane nature.* *pa.* 95.

Whereas I am willing to carry the reasons of good and evil higher, founding them in that relation they bear to the essential wisdom, purity, and holiness of the Divine nature, which relation is, in some measure, made known to us by those native notices and naturall impressions upon the minds of Men.

And whereas he tells us. *pa.* 192. That the proper measures of morall good must be taken from the original frame, ends and interests of our beings, I am afraid that all these in respect to each individual, and abstracted from all Law to direct us, would be found so variable, and uncertain, that morall good would, upon this hypothesis, prove a much more unfixed and unsettled thing, then
God

God, and Nature ever made it. *vide. pa. 72.*
Of humane Nature.

So that I humbly conceive, it would not be a sufficient asserting the eternall, and immutable nature of moral good, to say, that it is as immutable, as the frame of created nature, for we know, that this has, in some particular instances, been changed, and may be so againe, but the reasons of good and evill never were, never can be changed.

I shall conclude this with a judicious observation of Mr. *Beconsfalls*, in another case. *pa. 107.* The notions I have contended for, are founded in things, that fall in with the establisht sentiments of Mankind. And as the arguments suggested are, at least, as cogent and satisfactory, as those on the other side, it is not prudent to leave the common Road, and put things of moment, and importance upon an issue, that, it may be, wants Evidence, or at least contradicts some received truths or notions.

But as for, the apology he makes *pa. 186.* I think no apology can be sufficient for making use of new modes of expressions in matters of a moral concernment.

Short

*Short Remarks upon two Chapters
in the Oracles of Reason.*

IT is the worst use, that any can make of the belief of a Good, or natural Religion, from thence to infer the no necessity of future Revelation, whereas on the contrary; both from the nature of God and the Dispensations of Divine providence in the World, we may rather infer, if not the necessity, yet at least the great conveniency of a further Revelation.

For supposing the Corruption, and depravation of Mankind, which yet the very Heathens did acknowledge, and were intimately conscious of, it seemes more agreeable to the benignity of the Divine nature to pity, and relieve the misery of that state, by some new methods of Revealed mercy.

The dispensations of Divine providence do also seem to require it, thus the general
practise

practise of Sacrificeing, and the generall beliefe of the necessity of a Mediator, even in the first ages of the World; do either suppose or at least infer the great conveniency of such a thing, the better to in forme the World with the true nature, end and design of both those.

A Learned Physitian thought it necessary, as a preparatory vindication of his faculty, First, to state that question, *an terminum vite sit mobilis*, the profession of Physick being a very vaine, and idle thing, if all things come to pass by blind chance or fatall necessity. In like manner it would be in vain for Divines to talk of the grace of God made known to us by the Gospel, if there never was any such thing, as Divine Supernaturall Revelation in the World.

It were to be wisht that Discourses of this nature, to prove the very principles of Christianity, were neither seasonable nor necessary, but such is the iniquity of the age we live in, that deisme appears bare-fac'd in a Christian State, that it bears it self high upon the pretended strength of its own cause, and acknowledges no Oracles, but those of its own, *Viz. Of Reason.*

If one might venture to guess at the causes
of

of their mistakes (to omit that unfixedness of mind, and that affectation of popularity, hereby to gain to themselves the reputation of Men of more than ordinary parts) they perhaps might be first occasion'd by such steps and methods, as these.

1. Reason being both a name and thing, which always was, and ever will be justly valued, and esteemed in the World, and there being a time, when reason, or Philosophy was the great, if not the only guide to Man in things relating either to this World, or the other, that being the only rule, that we know of, that God gave the Heathens to direct 'em to a future happiness; this perhaps might be one occasion of the present Deisme of the age.

2. It has been the misfortune, that revelation has laid under, in the opinion of some Men, tho' without any just ground, that it bears a direct opposition, and contrariety to reason, now these Men improving and propagateing this opinion, as much as was possible in the World, they built themselves a Reputation by advancing Reason, which was once a sufficient guide to Men, even above, and in contradiction to Revelation.

3dly. 'Tis not improbable, but that these
Men

Men may be offended at the severity of the Christian Religion, not that I here go about to accuse 'em of immoralities, no! Their Liberal Education, their Candid temper, and their true and just sense of things, which otherwise they entertain, forbid me to harbour any such thoughts of 'em, yet I would appeal here even to their own private sentiments whether there be not something of truth in what I here intimate, and that they could be willing to purchase Heaven at some easier rate, or more agreeable to their particular humors or inclinations, than that prescrib'd by the Gospel.

4. Perhaps the Severe Apprehensions, which some Christians entertain concerning the desperate estate of all Heathens may make some run into the other extrem, *Viz.* That Natural Religion is sufficient for all, in order to Eternal Happiness, which is so unreasonably, as they think, deny'd to some for such. But to passe by these Conjectures.

Now in order to the clearer stating of the question betwixt us, we must consider.

1. That since we have been now above 16. hundred Years in possession of our Christian Religion in particular, and much longer of a reveal'd Religion in general, therefore the deist can claim no other part
in

in this dispute, than that of an opponent, and here he must prove the History of the Gospel, as to matters of fact, to be false, and those ancient Apologys, for, and those more Modern defences of Christianity insufficient.

If it be reply'd, that Natural Religion preceded Revelation, and so was the more Ancient. I answer. 1. Some are of Opinion that God immediately after the Creation of *Adam*, did give him either an inward or outward revelation or both, of things convenient or necessary for him to be known *then*, tho' perhaps they were such, as in progress of time, and long study and observation might have been found out afterwards.

Here I must confess, we have no certain Rule to guide us, but must only go by conjectures, such as are more rationally and piously credible. But if after all any one will positively say, that such was the perfection of Natural reason before the Fall, that all those things relating more particularly to *that present State of affairs*, might have been found out by it self, I shall not much oppose it; however this is certain, that God immediately after the fall of *Adam*, did reveal the Gospel to him in Paradise, by the Promise of the Messiah, and
this

this the Deist must acknowledge, unless he can prove the History of *Moses* to be false.

2. In those first Ages of the World God did convey his will and pleasure to Men by Angels upon extraordinary occasions, so that they could not be even then, said to be absolutely without Divine Revelation.

3. They had Tradition, which was better grounded and of more Authority *then*, than it can pretend to now, because of the long life of the Patriarchs, so that it did not go through so many hands, and consequently not so liable to be corrupted; tho' I do nothere suppose this Tradition to extend to Moral Dutys.

4. Notwithstanding all these helps, and assistances, they felt the sad want of a standing Rule to direct 'em, for those first Ages of the World soon degenerated into Idolatry, and this and worse would be the Fate of the present Age if God in judgment should remove the Gospel from us.

But to return, the Deist must *adly* prove, that it is a thing contrary to the Divine Nature to make any further Declaration of his will, than what he has made known by the light of Nature, he cannot say, that this is contrary to the free, and positive de-

determination of the Divine Will, for how can he know this, seeing he doth not suppose any outward Declaration of Gods will ever made to Man. If he say that God never made any but only this, *viz.* That he would make no more, but what he had discovered to Man by the Light of Nature: I hope he will prove what he says, and show where ever God made any such Declaration: If he say that there was no need of any further: This is a very weak way of argueing against matter of fact: If I should say, that there is nothing writ in a certain Book call'd *the Oracles of Reason*, in defence of Deisme, because there was no need of it, there was enough writ of that before, I believe he would not grant the Argument to be of any force.

Some are of Opinion, that that Book call'd *the Oracles of Reason* is not worth the taking notice of by way of Answer, it being, they say, such as would soon dye of it self; I must confess I have no great opinion of the performance therein, *viz.* Of the Letters of those Gentlemen one to another, (I do not speak of the Translations) not that I here reflect upon the abilities of the Persons, but of the weakness of the cause, that was not capable of a better defence.

— *Si Pergama dextra*
Defend si possint, Etiam hæc. —

But because some are apt to look upon this as an argument of the strength of a cause, when no one vouchsafes an answer to it, tho' perhaps the true reason is, because they think it does not deserve any, I shall therefore briefly consider that part of it, which is writ in favour of Deïsme, if not for its own sake, yet for the sake of those, who are too apt to overvalue every thing, that may seem to gratify their own private inclinations, and if some think as meanly of this, as others do of that, I am very well satisfy'd, *if they should dye both together.*

The
 I shall confess I have no objection
 to the performance of them. Of the
 kinds of these Genes one to another
 (I do not speak of the Transitions) not
 that I have found them in the history of
 nations, but of the likeness of the state
 that was not capable of a better defence.

*The Summary account of the Deists
Religion examin'd, pa. 88.*

I Shall not need to advertise the Reader, that the Deist here meant and so often mentioned in this and the like discourses, is not one barely, that never heard of Divine revelation, but being born and living several years, in the outward profession of Christianity, having now at last taken some distaste at it, has in effect renounced it, or at least the necessity of believing the fundamentals of it.

Chap. 1st. He here tells us, that *whatever is adoreable amiable or imitable by Mankind, is in one supreme, infinite and perfect being*, that is, they believe one infinite, supreme, perfect being, and do adore, love and imitate his imitable perfections. The worst of Spirits believe the one, and the best of Heathens practise the other, and if the World has liv'd it self back again into *Gentilism*, it may thank the Deists for it.

Chap, 2d. That God is not to be worshipped by an Image we willingly grant. 2d. Nor by Sacrifice, I know the Deists now are for no Sacrifices at all, but here I would propound it to consideration, whether they do not owe this truer notion and righter apprehension of things to that clearer light, which they have received from Divine Revelation; tho' they are not so ingenuous as to acknowledge it, for why should they now, abstractedly considered from all communication with Christians oppose the constant opinion and practise of their great Patriarchs and Apostles; the Heathen Philosophers, in this particular. I know indeed, the *Stoicks* tell us, that it is below *their wise Man* to repent, and by consequence that there is no need of Sacrifices; But these were a sort of Fanaticks in their Religion, and dream'd of I know not what kind of perfection, which their State was not capable of, their discourses many times contradicting their practises: I grant also, that the Heathen Poets, and Philosophers, about the time of our Saviours appearance in the World, began to speak very meanly, and undervaluingly of Sacrifices, but then they may thank the Christian Religion for this.

Sacrificeing was a thing early prevailing

in the World, and it will be very difficult for the Deists, according to their principles to give any tolerable account hereof. Indeed Christians are divided in their opinions herein, some asserting a Divine positive command, and Revelation of God to *Adam*, tho' not mention'd in Scripture; neither is this, say they, any Argument that there was no such thing, because *Scripturæ silentium non est semper argumentativum*.

Others suppose Sacrifices founded in nature, tho' this, say some, is not altogether so reasonable, because they cannot conceive, how naturall reason abstracted from a Divine command, could suggest, that God could be acceptably worship'd by the destruction of his Creatures.

Others distinguish betwixt Typical and Eucharisticall Sacrifices, these latter, they say, may be founded in Nature, tho' the same cannot be so easily granted of the other: What the reall truth herein is, perhaps is not so easie to determine. However, the Deists seem here to have a particular notion of their own, *Viz.* That Sacrifices were only Typicall of repentance, and sorrow for sin, but this without any ground either from reason, or authority.

Having premised this in generall, I shall

come now more particularly to examine, what he says upon this subject.

God is not to be worshiped by Sacrifices, he says, because *Sponsio non valet, ut alter pro altero puniatur.*

Here he seemes to reflect upon the Sacrifice of our blessed Saviour. But why should any such maxim be of more authority than those of St. Paul? Neither doth this, when rightly understood, any ways contradict that commutation of punishment asserted by Christianity.

For we commonly say, that *volenti non fit injuria* and that truly too, with the concurrence of these two conditions. 1st. That the Person so undertaking may lawfully do it, that is, if he be not under any moral, or political obligation to the contrary. 2. If the Person be not imposed upon, by want of a full, and true understanding of the thing so undertaken. Now both these conditions did concur in our blessed Saviour. 1st. He had power to lay down his Life, and he had power to take it up againe. 2, It would be profane to think that the Son of God did not well understand what he did, when he undertook the work of Mans Redemption. However, no such *sponsio* can be made with a brute Creature. Here he seemes to reflect upon the Jewish Sacrifices: But 1st. He should have proved

prov'd, either that the whole History of Scripture, relating to *Moses* and the promulgation of the Law, as to matter of Fact, was false, or 2^{ly}. That it was contrary to reason, and unworthy of God to institute such Sacrifices, as the *Jewish* were, that is, supposing the promise of the Messiah given to *Adam* and the *Patriarchs*, that in the fulness of time the great Saviour of the World should appear for the Redemption of Mankind, considering also the proneness of the *Jewish* Nation to Idolatry, and their hankening after the Gods of *Egypt*; he should prove, that it was any way unworthy of the Oracles of God, and Religion to institute such Sacrifices, as should be both Typical of the Sacrifice of our Saviour, and also Symbolical of that purity, and instrumental in order to the procuring of that piety, and holyness, which (under Christ) was the great and most effectual meanes to happyness: And therefore we do not say, that any mere external rite can reinstate the creature after sin in God's favour again, and whereas he sayes, that it is the first error in all particular Religions, that external things, or bare opinions of the mind can after Sin propitiate God; whatever it was in other Religions, it is none in Christianity, because it asserts no such

E 3

thing

thing, but just the contrary. He concludes this Paragraph thus. *Enim facilius est, superstiosè quàm justè vivere.* Here tis observable, how strangely, these Men are for every thing purely Natural, a Natural Grammar, as well as a Natural Religion, and absolutely against any instituted Rules in either; but our positive Grammarians, those Men of Institution, tell us, that *Enim* doth not so well begin a Sentence.

3. *Not by a Mediator*, for that he says, is unnecessary: *Strenuè asseris, sed quo modo probas?* These Gentlemen seem to allow of no Authority, but their own: They will not believe God himself speaking in Scripture, and yet they expect that others should believe them upon their bare words, for they seldom go about to prove any thing; he does indeed tell us, that Gods mercy is sufficient for his justice. But will he infer from hence that God neither can, nor will ever inflict any punishment. I do not here Dispute whether God might not have pardoned Sin some other way, than that which he did make use of, but considering him as a just Judge, and governour of the World, exercising an Vniversal, wise, and just providence therein, it was necessary, that Sin should not go unpunished.

2. God *must* he says, *appoint this Mediator, and so he was reconciled to the World before.* It was indeed in Gods power to accept, or not to accept a Mediation, or Mediator, when offer'd, and he did first declare his pacability upon such, and such terms, and so was so far reconciled to Mankind, even before any Mediator was offer'd, or accepted.

3. He says, *a Mediator derogates from the infinite mercy of God.* But I suppose, he will not say, that God is always bound to act according to the utmost extent of his mercy; it was in Gods power, whether he would accept of any termes of reconciliation, or no; and it is no lessening of his mercy to require such just, and reasonable, and advantageous conditions at least on our side, nay such, as seem as much meanes, naturally tending to the obtaining humane happiness, as conditions to be performed in order thereunto: If he would consider God, as a wise, and just governour of the World, these little objections would soon vanish.

But then positively, he says, God is to be worshiped by an inviolable adherence in our lives to all the things *quæ sunt Deum*. This grant, but I further add, to all things that are *Deum*, as well as *quæ sunt Deum* so.

CHAPTER. III.

Of Punishments after this Life.

HE tells us, that a Man, indued with *the vertues before mentioned, need not fear to trust his Soul with God*; the vertues he mentioned are these, *viz. Repentance, obedience for the future, ending in the assimilation of a Mans Life to God.* These are indeed very large, and comprehensive vertues, but I would only aske, whether the Man he speakes of be a Christian by profession, or no; if he be, then there is something further requir'd, than these mere practical vertues, *viz. A beliefe in Christ according to the tenor of the Gospel, &c.* If he be a mere Heathen by Birth, and Education, tho' I do not deny all possibility of future happiness to such an one, yet I think, he cannot performe such obedience to the commands of God, nor so far assimilate himself to him, but that after all there will remaine
some

some just fears, and jealousyes of his future happines: For tho' *no Creature was made with a malevolent intent*, yet by their own fault, they may make themselves such, as even after all they can doe, by the light of Nature, for their reformation, yet upon a strict examination will find that they have but too just grounds to doubt of their future happines.

I deny not, but that even good Christians sometimes may entertaine some such doubts as these, but then it must be considered, whether this be not rather the fault of the Man, then of his Religion; whether Christianity rightly understood; believ'd, and practis'd doth not afford us greater, and better assurance of Salvation, than the mere light of nature can doe. And tho' *verisimile est similem deo à deo non negligi*; Yet a mere natural Man; who never heard any thing of Divine Revelation, cannot when he comes to die, build any certain grounds of trust in God, upon bare verisimilitudes.

CHAPTER. IV.

HERE he asserts *the probability of a Deists Salvation before the credulous, and ill living Papists.* It is not my business to make comparisons : Only I say, that neither Papists, nor any other sort of Christians, tho' far more Orthodox than they in their principles, if they live ill, can ever be safe ; but he says, *the Deist is not an Idolater.* What then ? Neither is an Atheist one, yet this is no great commendation, either of the Man, or of his Opinion ; but he says, that *the morality in Religion is above the mystery in it.* I only say, that both are necessary in the Christian Religion, and they ought not to be separated, or oppos'd one to the other ; and therefore, when he repeats the same over again in the bottom of *pa. 91.* that the *credulous Christian, that believes Orthodoxly but lives ill, is not safe ;* this is something like the Quakers way of arguing, when they

they tell us, that an outward conformity to the orders, and constitutions either of Church, or State signifies nothing without inward honesty, and integrity of heart; this we grant, but may we not be as honest, sober, and sincere in the Communion of the Church of *England*, as they are out of it, and may not we live as holy Lives in the profession of the Christian Religion, as they do in the Natural? I am sure Christianity has all the advantages towards a holy Life, that Naturall Religion can pretend to, and many more.

But If the Deist errs, he errs not like a Fool, but Secundum verbum after enquiry. But may not a Man err, like a Fool, and yet after enquiry? Will a superficial enquiry excuse the folly? But he goes on; *If he be sincere in his principles when dying, he may appeal to God.* But how such a Deist, as we are now speaking of, that is, one who profess'd the Christian Religion, but now has renounc'd it, can be sincere either in Relinquishing the Christian, or embracing the Naturall Religion, is not so easie to be understood. *Te bone deus, quaesui per omnia.* If an honest Heathen at his Death should thus appeal to God, I should have a great deal of Charity for him, but when Christians renounce their Religion, and then turn Seekers of that which they need

need not, and ought not to loose, reason it self will judge the case to be much different.

At the end he annexeth some notes, I suppose in favour to and honour of Natural Religion, but it is a great disparagement to the cause, these Gentlemen engage in, that a Boy of 12 Years old, but moderately instructed in the Christian Religion, shall be able to produce out of Scripture matters of more sublime theology, and more profound morality, than these adult Naturalists, have here done out of any of their Heathen Authors.

1. He tells us, that the *Grand Arcanum of Religion among the Pythagoreans was, that the object of Divine worship was one, and Invisible*. To this I shall oppose 1 Tim. 1: 17. *Now to the King Eternall, immortal, invisible, and only wise God be glory, and praise now, and for ever more, Amen.* Now I durst appeal to the Deist himself, whether there be not a greater air of Divinity in this, than in the other.

2. The Heathens, he says, notwithstanding their topickall Deity acknowledged *one supreme God, only they said this God being of so high a nature, and there being other intermediate Beings betwixt God, and Man-kind, they were to address themselves to them,*

as to Mediators, &c. But now Christianity teaches the Doctrine of the one, only true God, without these vicious mixtures of our Addresses to any other intermediate beings, *So that, he says, the Opinion of the necessity of a Mediator was the foundation of the Heathen Idolatry.*

If the Opinion of the necessity of a Mediator be well grounded, then it adds strength to the reasonableness of our Saviours Mediation, neither will it be any prejudice to it, that it was the occasion of the Heathen Idolatry, if perhaps it was so, for the same may be urg'd against the opinion or belief of a God, that it was the occasion of all the Superstition and Idolatry in the World, for if there had been no belief of a God, there could not well not have been any Idolatry.

But if this Opinion of the Heathens was not well grounded, it is no prejudice to our Saviours Mediation, because it doth not depend upon it: Tho' 'tis probable, that God did occasion, or suffer that Opinion so early to prevail in the World, foreseeing that it might afterwards be made use of, to facilitate the belief of the Christian Religion in this particular; but I would not have any conclude from hence, that I found the mediation of Christ only upon

pru-

prudential considerations, that I utterly disown, nor do I think that any such odious inference can, in strictness of reason, be drawn from the former assertion.

I shall only further take notice of one odd piece of reasoning P. 93. *That there is a generosum honestum hid in all our Souls, is plain from the Epicurean Deists themselves, for they labour to have their vices imputed rather to a superiority of their reason above that of others, than to a servitude of their reason to their passions, which shows that Vice is naturally esteemed a base and low thing.* How the conclusion follows from the premises, I do not well see ; that which seems more obvious to observe from hence, is, that the Epicurean Deists had a mind rather to be counted Knaves than Fooles, or that they went about to mitigate their Vices by ascribing them to a very preternatural cause, viz. The Superiority of their reasons above that of other Men.

There are some few Notes more upon this Subject, but I am afraid the Reader will think I have already insisted too long upon things too inconsiderable. And is not this now a Scheme of Religion worthy of an *Immortal Deist*? Who would not from hence be apt to think, that these Men could write as good a Moral as the Gospel?

What

what less glorious Title than that of *Oracle*, becomes such profound reasoning, as this? But what I have here offer'd, I hope, may be at least a *Responsum ad hominem*; If I may so speak, that is, such as tho' not the best, and most perfect in it self, yet a sufficient Answer to him, against whom I write. And I hope it will be no arrogance, or selfe conceit in me to say, that probably my defence of our common Christianity had been more strong, and Nervous, if the opposition had been more considerable.

*Of Natural Religion as opposed to
Divine Revelation, pa. 195.*

THE chief heads of this Natural Religion, he says, consists of Seven particulars, *Whereof the 6th. is this, That we are to expect rewards, and punishments, hereafter, according to our actions in this Life, which includes the Souls immortality.* I suppose he takes it in the best, and most proper sense of Immortality, that is, by nature:

ture, there are indeed some of these Gentlemen, who hold the materiality of the Soul, and that it dyes with the Body, but is again Created, or reproduc'd at last, by the power of God, and thus in some respect may be said to be Immortal; I know not whether this Opinion has not received some encouragement by a piece of speculation in Mr. *Lock's Essayes*, pa. 270. which might give occasion to others, to carry the notion further, and to worse purpose than he ever design'd it; for this Argument has been made use of to prove the materiality even of God himself. *Orac: Of Reason*, pa. 188. Nor do I here go about to charge Mr. *Lock* with the bad use that others may make of his opinions, which were also the opinions of some long before Mr. *Lock* was born: Tho' withall I think, there is more notice taken of what he says now, than of what twenty old Philosophers said before: And further this opinion of his, viz. *Of matter's thinking*, seems to have a bad influence upon some other parts of his better reasonings; for if *matter may think*, it will take away the certainty of an immaterial substance in Man; as that great, and excellent Prelate, the Bp. of *Worcester* has sufficiently prov'd.

2. And it will be very difficult to know what clear, and distinct Ideas are, and when

we

we have 'em, if we have not such of this, that *matter cannot think.*

But Mr. Lock tells us, Pa. 270, *That it is impossible for us, by the contemplation of our Ideas, without Revelation, to discover, whether omnipotence has given to matter fitly dispos'd, a power of perceiving, and thinking, or else joyn'd, and fixt to matter, so dispos'd a thinking immaterial substance; it being equally easy, in respect of our notions, to conceive, that God can, if he pleases, superad to our Idea of matter a faculty of thinking, as that he should add to it another substance with a faculty of thinking.*

To this I Answer.

1. It is no derogating from Divine omnipotence, to say, that God cannot doe any thing in a subject contrary to the nature of the thing it selfe; thus if matter be in its own nature incapable of thinking 'tis no lessening of Divine power, to say that God cannot make it, it still remaining matter, to think; now that matter cannot think, is evident not only from the Idea we have of it, but from all that evidence of reason that results from thence, that is and from all those absurdities, and inconveniences that would follow from such a supposal.

2. It is not very Philosophicall to have
such

such frequent recourse to the Divine omnipotence, and to argue from the utmost extent of possibility, for this would take away in a great measure, all our present grounds, of certainty, and by degrees lead us to the very borders of *Scepticism*, would any one believe *Epicurins's* opinion concerning the originall of the World the sooner, because we cannot prove, that it implies any Logically contradiction, that the fortuitous concourse of atomes might possibly at last hit upon such a regular frame of a World, as we now behold? Tho' I believe the case here before us, *viz.* That of matters thinking, is much fuller of absurdity, and contradiction.

3. Whereas he says, in his first Edition, *tis Equally easy to conceive, that God can, if he pleases, superad, &c.* I find it thus quoted by the Bp. of *worcester*, I suppose out of his latter Editions, *in respect of our notions, it is not much more remote from our comprehension, to conceive that God can, if he pleases. &c. Equally easie to conceive, and not much more remote from our comprehension to conceive, are expressions, that do not altogether signify the same thing, so that this learned Author seemes somewhat to waver in his Opinion as to this particular.*

But then what difficulty is there, in supposing a thinking substance joyned to an
un-

unthinking one, and the thinking one to perform those operations, which the other could not? Is it equally easy, or not much more remote from our comprehensions to conceive, how we may add to a Fool or Ideot the power or faculty of Wisdom, as to conceive how we may joyn to him a wise Guardian to direct him in all his actions. Seeing therefore this opinion, of the possibility of matters thinking is a Novel one, the proof hereof must lye upon those, that assert it, and here 'tis not sufficient to say, that they know not, how far the power of matter doth, or may extend, but they must positively prove, that it extends so far.

But Mr. *Lock* tells us, Pa. 270. *That Philosophers ought not Magisterially to determine in doubtful Cases, and that there is a certain Modesty, which very well becomes Philosophy:* This is very true, and yet this Modesty may err in the excess; the Scepticks, are in some sense, the most modest Sect of Philosophers, and yet not the better for that.

And whereas he saith, that all the great ends of Morallity, and Religion, are well enough secured without Philosophical proofes of the Souls immateriallity, &c.

So, what if another should say, that all
the

the ends of Nature are sufficiently secured tho' God always, when we went to sleep, annihilated the Soul, but then when either the Body was sufficiently refreshed, or violently press'd upon by some suddain accident, that then God always created it again.

As for those Arguments which may seem to be drawn from our night Dreams, these, I doubt not, may be solv'd in a way suitable to the Hypothesis, that is, that tho' the *Main body of the Soul*, as it were, be annihilated, yet the Atmosphere or some hot Steams thereof may remain still in the Body, which, like so many Centinels, are left here behind to give some small intimations of what pass'd, during her absence, or state of non-entity: I know no demonstration can be brought against this, and yet I fancy whoever should go about to Philosophize at this rate, would sooner be laugh'd at, than believed.

Some things may be asserted, which can neither be fully, and clearly confuted, or shown to be false, nor proved to be really true: And in such things as these, the advantage always lyes on the side of the defendant, thus in that question whether *the Soul doth always think, or no*, either
side

side may be defended, but neither sufficiently confuted.

But to proceed,

The 7th. is this, *that when we err from the rules of our Duty, we ought to repent, and trust in Gods mercy for pardon.* This indeed we ought to do, and it is very reasonable we should do so. But then it may be question'd what kind of sorrow it is, that is availeable for the remission of sins, for tho' some kind of Natural sorrow be the necessary result of Conscience from the sense of having done some foolish, or wicked action, yet it may be question'd whether this be that ingenuous sorrow, which is both in its own nature, and by Gods appointment so expiatory of sin. And further, how can we have any just ground to trust in God for pardon of sin, even according to the dictates of natural reason, unless to our Repentance we add also, not only a resolution of amendment, but actual Reformation also of our Lives, if time and opportunity doe permit.

I shall now examine that *Oracular Syllogisme*, which seemes to be spoken, as it were, *ex Tripode*, and which, I suppose, he looks upon as no less, than demonstration.

That

That Rule, which is necessary to our future happiness, ought to be made known to all Men.

But no Rule of reveal'd Religion was, or ever could be made known to all Men.

Therefore no reveal'd Religion is necessary to our future happiness. No instituted Rules, tho' it be in Logick it selfe, can meet with any approbation among some Men, I shall therefore examine this Syllogisme, even according to the Rules of natural Logick it self. And First, how doth he prove that it is necessary that there should be one single, determinate Rule for the future happiness of all Men? The *Gentiles* had the Law of Nature, the *Jews* the Law of *Moses*, the *Christians* the Gospel, or the Law of Christ for their Rule; I would further ask him, what he meanes by *Our* happiness in the major proposition. If we apply it to *Christians*, it makes the proposition absolutely false; for what necessity is there that the Gospel should be made known to all Men, in order to its being a Rule for future happiness to *Christians*? The Rule of happiness ought to be made known to all, to whom it is a Rule, but no further; but let us see how he proves the Major, viz.

Our

Our future happiness depends upon our obeying, or our endeavouring to fulfill the known will of God, but that Rule, which is not generally known, cannot be generally obey'd; therefore that Rule which is not generally known cannot be the Rule of our happiness. Here we may see how the Original sin of the first proposition transfuses it selfe to all its Posterity, and renders the whole Argument a mere blunder, that Rule that is not generally known, cannot be generally obeyed, but may not the Gospel, tho' it be not known to all, be a Rule to those whom it is known and to whom it is intended, as such, that is, to Christians?

Those who were born in a Christian state, and who have liv'd for some time in the profession of the Christian Religion, cannot but have the Rule of the Gospell made known to 'em.

But he tells us again, *pa.* 197. That the *natural Religion will suffice for our happiness, because it is the only general means propos'd.* But I cannot yet be satisfy'd with this way of Arguing: And that for these two reasons.

I. Because this would prove, not only that God has not made any other declaration of his will, than that contain'd in nature, but also that he could not have
done

done any such thing, unless he had made it of as large an extent, as the light of Nature, that is, to all the World. Now let us suppose, that God had actually made such a Revelation of his Will, and in the same manner, as he has done in the Gospel, (and I challenge all the Deists in the World to prove the impossibility of such a thing) yet the argument would lie as strong against the thing then, as it doth now: So that this argument proves too much and by consequence nothing at all to the purpose.

2. I have often heard it asserted by this Gentleman, but never yet any solid reason given, why the want of an universal revelation of the Gospel to all the World, should make it of less force, or obligation, where it is. Is it the less day with us, because it is at the same time Night in other Places?

Pa. 198. *The several Inustrations, and expiations formerly practised in the World were but symbolically, and refer'd to our sorrow, and repentance: That is the true and only expiation for Sin, and is so agreed, upon by all Men, in all Ages, and of all Religions.*

The original of Sacrifices is variously disputed by Men of several Opinions, but according

according to the Deists Principles, they can only be founded in nature, because they do not suppose any positive Revelation of Gods will made afterwards to mankind. But now if all Sacrifices were only Symbolical of Repentance, I do not know why Nature should go so far about, as to enjoyn Sacrifices at all, why should not Nature have enjoyned Repentance only, without any such Sacrifices, as have no Intrinsick prevalency for the pardon of sin?

But how comes he, so much like an Oracle, to determine that *Repentance has been so agreed upon by all Men, in all Ages, and of all Religions.* Whereas the contrary is rather true, that no company of Men of all Ages and of all Religions ever agreed, that Repentance was the only expiation of sin, in opposition to, or seperation from other conditions and qualifications.

Pa. 199. *If one Religion was once known to be true, Mankind would all agree in it, otherwise those marks of truth in it were not visible, which are necessary to draw an universal consent.* But a reveal'd Religion may have sufficient marks of truth in it, so as to be able to satisfy any rational enquiry, and yet not be able to draw an universal consent, lust, passions, prejudices, and false Opinions may sometimes hinder truth from

gaining that universal Empire. which otherwise it might justly challenge.

Pa. 202, *I have already endeavour'd to prove, that it is not necessary that God should reveal more, and therefore till that point be determin'd, I humbly doubt, and suspend my belief.* And I have already told him that the controversie doth not depend upon that point, but upon this, whether God hath actually reveal'd any more, than what he first made known by the light of Nature. It is not for him to prescribe limits to God, or to tell him what is necessary, what not.

Another Objection he says may be this, *that there is no foundation in natural Religion, for a vertuous Life, or at least not so great, as in a reveal'd Religion; where Rewards and Punishments are propos'd,* If he had urg'd it thus, where Rewards and Punishments are *more clearly* propos'd, than in the natural Religion, then he had done right to the Objection; and in his answer I do not see how in the least he attempts to prove rewards, and punishments *as clearly* propos'd in the Natural, as in the Reveal'd Religion, which yet he ought to have done in order to the giving a full answer to the Objection.

Pa. 203. *Another Objection is, a difference betwixt*

betwixt our condition, and that of the Heathens, for if they liv'd up to the height of Vertue and known Reason, they might (say some Charitable Christians) be happy in a Future State, we cannot, because a Reveal'd Religion has been discover'd to us more than to them, tho' we believe it not. This seems to be the substance of the Objection. The Inference as he calls it, is this, therefore we ought in our own defence to embrace it.

But let us see what Answer he returns to the Objection, he says, *it supposes a reveal'd Religion, which is yet to prove.* But here he may consider, that we having been in possession of our reveal'd Religion so many hundred years, we have very good reason to suppose it to be true, till such times as he can prove the contrary: And perhaps he is one of the first of those hardy Men in *England*, who having been brought up to that age in the Christian profession, has now at last, in effect renounc'd it.

And if the Heathens, he says, living up to the light of Naturall Religion might be happy, I see no reason, but why we may be so too. We, that is, Persons bred up in the Christian Religion, but now having a mind to pick a quarrel with it, design to return to a certain more refined sort of *Paganisme*.

But to this I Answer, no Christian, as such, can be eternally happy, except his righteousness exceed the righteousness of mere natural Religion, for why may not God require higher degrees of holiness there, where he hath given both clearer knowledge of Mens duty and better assistances, for the performing of it? And can we think it reasonable, that God should deal the better with any Man for turning *Apostate*? or indeed that he should be admitted into the same rank of Candidates for happiness, with a mere natural *Pagan*, who never knew any other Religion? I think he cannot reasonably expect it, because one, who has been thoroughly perswaded of the truth of Christianity, cannot possibly be so fully afterwards convinced of the contrary, but that, in all probability, he will live in a state of self condemnation all his life after, unless he fall into such a continued course of debauchery, as to Sin away all sense even of naturall Religion it self: And the Sin of Apostacy from the Christian Religion will be such a dead weight upon his Conscience, as will necessarily sink him below the condition of an honest Heathen, for I believe, even such an one may dye with better hopes of future happiness, than a Renegado Christian.

Here

Here I shall further shew the unreasonableness, and imprudence of Deisme.

1. **D**EISME gives no tolerable account of one of the most considerable Phænomena's in the World, *Viz.* Of that speedy, and general reception of the Christian Religion in the World, the whole thing, according to the Deist's principles, being a mere nullity: Here I might insist upon that which is urg'd herein. 1st. The contrariety that the Doctrine of Christianity bore to the Vicious principles, and practises of the World.

2. The great opposition it met withall from all sides, and yet its prevailing against, and conquering all difficulties, without any outward, visible assistance. 3^{ly}. The first Promulgers of it were wise, and honest Men, they were too Learned to be impos'd upon themselves, and too honest to

deceive others. 4th. Neither could there be any thing of interest in the case, seeing they engaged in a cause wherein they could not have any prospect of advantage to themselves; these things I only mention, being more fully prosecuted by others.

2. Deism requires more evidence for things, than they are capable of, or more than the nature of things will admit: Now we have as great assurance of the truth of Christianity, as we can have of any thing of that nature; and as much, as we possibly could have, supposing the thing to be absolutely true. If we require more than this, we then run into Scepticism, the greatest folly in the World, next to Atheism.

3. Deism is unreasonable, because it pretends to be certain of that, which no Man can be certain of, *viz.* That Christianity is false, something that has been either falsely imposed upon the World, or what the World has foolishly imposed upon it self; this the Deist must be certain of, otherwise it is the most imprudent thing imaginable, because of that foolish choice he makes, and the infinite hazard he runs thereby: So that let the genius of Christianity be as milde, and charitable as we

can suppose it, yet I know not that it has any where declared Pardon for Apostates, and it is no ways contrary to the Laws either of God, or Man, to proceed against those who have renounced their allegiance, rather like Rebels, and Traitors, than fair Enemies. I have hitherto examin'd this Answer to the first part of the Objection mentioned. *pa.* 203. I shall now proceed to the Inference, as he calls it. *pa.* 204. That tho' *a supernatural Religion be dubious, yet it is the safest way to embrace it.* We do not grant Supernatural Religion to be in the least dubious, therefore the consequence is good, and well grounded, that it is more reasonable in it self, and more safe for us to embrace it.

This, methinks, is no hard matter to prove; one might rather wonder, how in a Christian state we should be put upon the proof of such a thing, as this. For first to imbrace, or comply with such a Religion, as Christianity, is no violation of any command, or duty of natural Religion it self, for the utmost efforts that Deisme hitherto has, or perhaps can make, are only some little difficulties it urges against the Old or New Testament, not any positive arguments to prove the falsity of either, nay, I am apt to believe, that even natural

natural Religion, seriously, and impartially considered and followed, would by easy steps lead a Man to the embracing of the Christian

2. Christianity, and natural Religion have the same generall end, and designe, to promote the honour of God, and the good of Men by Temperance, Righteousness and Holiness, and then, as to the additions contained in the revealed Religion, they are not any vicious mixtures, or adulterations of the natural, but rather improvements of it to higher degrees of excellency and perfection: Christianity doth not propound any less noble end, nor makes use of any less effectual meanes than natural Religion doth, but rather advances, and improves both: So that if it be possible to be safe in the natural, it is much more so in the revealed Religion, Christianity has all the advantages of natural Religion and many more.

Then as to the difficulties that are pretended to accompany the practise of the Christian Religion, *Viz.* A more profound mortification of our lusts, and passions, and a more exalted degree of holiness, and piety, this certainly is rather an argument of its excellence than any diminution of it, especially considering the great assistance

sistances that the reveal'd Religion affords us to performe that Obedience, which it requires of us, and the greatness of the reward that attends the practise of it.

So that if reveal'd Religion be false, it can no ways prejudice the designs of the Natural, but if it be true, as certainly it is, then the mere belief of a Natural Religion will be of fatal consequence to those, who have enjoy'd the glad tidings of the Gospel.

But then Pa. 204. he says, *I cannot embrace what comes not within the compass of my knowledge.* But in Order to our embracing of a thing it is not necessary, that it should so come within the compass of our knowledge, as that we should fully comprehend all the Modes, and circumstances of it, thus we may embrace the Mysterys of our faith, tho' they do not thus come within the compass of our knowledge, and if we must believe nothing but what we thus comprehend, as to the Modes and manner of the thing, then we must in obedience to this principle, reject the principal Articles even of Natural Religion also.

But he proceeds, *And if I cannot believe, 'tis a sign the Evidence is not strong enough to make me.* But our not believing is not always a signe that the Evidence is too

weak, but that our passions, and prejudices are too strong: Evidences in matters of Religion do not work, as Mathematical ones doe; not force assent, but suppose some previous dispositions of the Subject, upon which their efficacy many times depends: 'Tis sufficient, if the evidence be such, as may convince a rational and prudent Person, if Men will be perverse and and Scepticel, I know no remedy but they must remain so still, *pertinaciae remedium non pefuit Deus*: not in the common and ordinary Methods of his Providence.

He proceeds next to answer two Arguments of Sir Charles Woosley's, but I must Beg leave to tell him, that it is not his business to answer Arguments, unless they be such upon which the Issue and success of our cause depends. And here, 1 We assert the truth of the History of the Gospel, as to matter of fact. 2. This suppos'd, we say it certainly proves the Divinity of the Doctrine, and a Supernatural Revelation contain'd therein. Here he must prove the falseness of the one, and the in-consequence of the other; and what ever he doth less, than this, it is altogether nothing to his purpose, no ways tends to make good his cause: Tho' I do not say that he has Answered Sir Charles his Arguments, I think he has

has not, but suppose he had, Sir Charles never design'd the whole cause should depend upon these two, he might urge 'em as further confirmations of the thing he was then about, but he did not lay the whole stress of the cause upon 'em.

I shall make some short remarks upon his Answer to the 2^d. Argument. Pa. 206. The Argument is this. *Propitiation for our Offences must be supernaturally discovered, or else we can come upon no certain terms of acceptance with God.* In answer to this he tells us, *that all the World, who have agreed upon the fault, agreed upon the compensation, viz. Sorrow and true Repentance, and reason dictates this without revelation.* I wonder why he should say that all the World is agreed upon this point, when all the Christian World differs from him in it; that is, tho' they grant, that Sorrow for sin, and Repenance are necessary conditions in order to our being reconcil'd to God, yet they do not exclude but necessarily include the satisfaction of Christ: And whereas he says, that Reason dictates this without Revelation, I answer, that tho' Reason may dictate a natural propensity, and inclination in God to pardon, and forgiveness, yet we cannot come to God upon such certain terms of acceptance, as we may do upon the assurance we have
by

by Divine Revelation, and that for these two reasons. 1. Guilt is naturally full of fears, and jealousies; but Natural Religion is not so fully suited to answer, and take away all these, as Christianity is; as might easily be made appear. 2. Natural reason cannot so fully assure us of the truth, and sincerity of our Repentance, as it doth or may convince us of the heinousness of our many sins, and repeated provocations against God, and I think Natural Religion doth not dictate Sorrow, and Repentance for sin any further a means of reconciliation with God, than as it is sincere.

But he tells us now, *that more in all Ages have agreed that Lustrations and Sacrifices without repentance were nothing, &c.* Before he had said, *that all in all Ages were agreed, &c.* Now only more were so.

But it will be hard here rightly to compute the number of Voices and it is probable it may go against him here too, since there is scarce any whole Nation in the Heathen World, without Sacrifices and Lustrations (by Lustrations I mean whatever is outward, and Ceremonial) or if there be, tis probable they are without Repentance too.

But he sayes, *that bare Repentance is a sufficient compensation for an Infinite Offence against*

an Infinite Being, is what our Adversarys deny, and therefore point us to an Infinite Sacrifice for sin, viz. Jesus Christ; But we do not point to any other Sacrifice, or propitiation for sin, than what God himself has pointed them to, and that with such clearness, and evidence as to matter of fact, as is beyond the possibility of their ever proving the contrary: and here will return the force of that Argument, Which like a dead weight, hung about the neck of Deisme, will at last sink it, viz. The necessity they lye under of proving the History of the Gospel, and the Doctrine therein contain'd, to be false.

I would willingly assert the necessity of Christs satisfaction, as far as possible, only not to introduce a fatality into the Divine nature, or to destroy the liberty of God's acting herein: Therefore I do not well understand what Mr. Norris means, when he tells us *pa. 4. Of his Reason, and Faith that the necessity of Christ's satisfaction ought to be grounded on the Essential order, and justice of God.* Was Christ's coming into the World made necessary by any other essential order, or justice of God, different from his own free good will, and love to Mankind: That Sin should not go unpunish'd was highly agreeable both to the wisdom, and justice of God, but yet we should

should be carefull not to entertain any opinions herein, which may seem to lessen the riches, and freeness of Divine goodness in sending his Son into the World for Mans Redemption.

And when we have asserted the truth of Christs satisfaction in offering himself a sacrifice for Sin, doth it any way derogate from the glory of God, or rather is it not highly agreeable to his *manifest wisdom*: *Ephe. 3. 10.* Thereby also to accomplish some other subordinate ends of Divine providence, such as were yet truly worthy of God to propound, and not unworthy of Christ to undertake.

But he tells us *pa. 207.* *That till all, who profess Christianity agree, whether Christ be a propitiation, or no, I need not goe about a further confutation of this Argument.*

But this seemes rather a slight way of stuffling off, than Answering the Argument, but is it indeed a sufficient Answer to any Doctrinal point, to say that all who profess the same Religion are not agreed in that particular? I may then tell this Gentleman, who asserts Repentance only a sufficient propitiation for Sin against God, that till all who profess Deisme, agree in this particular, I need not go about any farther

further refutation of it: For the Author of the summary account of the Deists Religion. *pa.* 89. Tells us, that some thing further besides repentance, *viz.* Obedience for the future, ending in an assimilation to God, is required in order to the reinstating a Man after Sin, in God's favour.

The Socinians indeed will not allow Christ, in a strict, and proper sense, to be a Sacrifice, or propitiation for Sin; But will it therefore follow, that it is not a truth, because these Men deny it: If what *Limborch* says, *pa.* 108. Of his *Amica Collatio cum Judæo*. Speaking of the two Natures in Christ, be true, *Adhuc non credunt Sociniani, & satis sunt Christiani*. If Socinians be Christians enough, than there is very little required of a Man, in reference to his *Credenda*, To make him a Christian.

What remains is either much what the same, with what has been already considered before; or something which seems his own peculiar way of arguing against himself, that so he might return the more easy Answers,. But I am afraid I have already tired my Reader in prosecuting these little things.

I cannot in justice or Charity suppose these Gentlemen such Deists, as border more
imme-

immediately upon Epicurism, because they assert the Providence of God, and a Future State of Rewards and Punishments. Only I would heartily, and humbly propound to their consideration, whether they being happily brought up in the belief, and practise of the Christian Religion, and their now falling back from it, whether I say this may not be a step naturally leading to that worst sort of Deism, little better than Atheisme: For what better or stronger reasons will they have for retaining the Natural Religion, than they had or might have had for Christianity?

It is to be fear'd that the Purity of the Precepts, and the severity of the Christian Doctrine, was the great offence they took at the Christian Religion, and may they not after such a breach, as it were, made upon their Consciences, be tempted to renounce even Natural Religion it self for the same reasons. *Nemo repente fit pessimus*: Men commonly by degrees arrive at the height of wickedness. Mr. Blount in his Letter Pa. 87. of the Oracles of Reason. *Tho' Deisme be a good manureing of a Mans Conscience, yet certainly, if sow'd with Christianity, it will produce the most profitable crop*: But 'tis reported that before his Death he fell from that

that more modest, and ingenious temper of mind which he here seem'd to express.

Uriel Acofta in his Life time was very wavering in his Religion, and at last turn'd Deist, and shot himself. The same Fate attended that unfortunate Gentleman both in his Life and Death. I shall make no personal reflections, only lay down this great truth, worthy to be consider'd, by the *Immortal Deist*, as he is call'd. *Pa. 95, That Christianity lays the best and surest foundation of living and dying well.*

I shall here, because of the affinity of the subject to this in hand, briefly examine some particulars, in the Translators preface to *Hierocles*, upon the Golden Verses of the *Pythagoreans*. Sheet a 4. The proposition he there advanecs is, this. *That it is possible by a due advertency to the light of nature sufficiently to discern betwixt good, and evil.* This is very true, unless perhaps there lyes some ambiguity in the word *sufficiently*, that the light of Nature doth, or may inform us in the greater stroaks, and instances of our duty, is certainly true, but whether it descends to all the particulars thereof, may be justly question'd; but then in the proof of this proposition, I think he goes further, the the nature of the

the thing requir'd, the Heathens might be able by the light of Nature to distinguish betwixt good and, evill, tho' their Writings did not fully come up to the height of Christianity.

I do not asserts he says, that the *Law of Nature was Engraven upon the hearts of Men in as faire Characters, as upon the two Tables of Stone, for then there would have been little, or no use of Revelation.* Here seems to be some little obscurity, both in the proposition, he layes down, and in the inference he makes from it, I shall briefly examine both;

1st. It seemes as reasonable to believe, that the Law of Nature was Engraven *At first* in as fair Characters upon the minds of Men, as it was afterwards upon the two Tables of Stone (I do not mean in any gross sense) that is, Natural Duties might be as well known to *Adam* in Paradice by the light of Nature, as they were afterwards to the *Jews* by the Promulgation of the Law, if the Law of Nature, in process of time, was so defac'd, that it could not be so easily Read, this was owing to the vicious principles, and practises, to the false opinions, and wicked Lives of Men afterwards. 2^{ly}. As to the inference, *For then there would have been little, or no use*

use of Revelation. This may refer either to the Revelation of the Law, or of the Gospell, to that of *Moses*, or that of *Christ*. If it refer to that of *Moses*, yet the Revelation of the Law by him might be of great use, by setting out, as it were a Second Edition of it upon Tables of Stone, when it was so miserably defaced before upon the minds of Men.

If it refer to the Gospell, that also might be of very great use, notwithstanding all the clearest Revelations that were made either by the Law of Nature, or by the Law of *Moses*, because the Revelation of the Gospell contains in it something, that was never designed to be made known, at least, so fully, by either: And he will not, I suppose, say, that the method of salvation, now revealed in the Gospell is contain'd in the Law of Nature, tho' it had been writ in as fair Characters, as that of the two Tables of Stone; nor can he say, that the Law of Nature fully, and clearly Imprinted upon the minds of Men, would render any further Revelation (particularly that of the Gospell) useless.

But yet he says, *that in the Writings of the Heathens is contain'd the whole Moral Law, and that*

that not only in the integral parts, but in its utmost intention, nor is there one Precept of Christianity so exalted, and Heroical, but may be paralell'd in an Heathen: No Man can deny this, he says, who has read the Morals of Plutarch, Seneca, Epictetus, Cicero, to these he also adds Juvenal and Persius.

I am not in the least willing to lessen the great excellencys that some of the Heathens have attain'd to, but yet I know no reason, why they should be equall'd with the Christians. As for those Moralists and Poets he mentions, 'tis observable that all of 'em, except Cicero liv'd after the time of our Saviour, and the promulgation of the Gospel, and it is certain that the Christian Religion had very much improv'd the Morals of the Heathen world at that time, and that they owe a great deal of that light, which appears in their writings, to the Sun of Rightousness, tho' they were not so ingenious, as to acknowledge it. So that there can be no necessary Argument drawn from these, to prove that the Heathens, purely as such, can vie with Christians in this particular. What was said of Seneca, may in some measure be said of the rest, *si Christianus Paganice, Si Paganus, Christiane Scripsit.*

Then as for those Heathens, that liv'd before our Saviours time, I think I shall do

do 'em nothing but right, and justice, in these following particulars.

1. They had no right notion of original sin, that general depravation, and corruption of humane nature either as to the true cause or cure of it, without which I think, there cannot be laid any such firm foundation of Vertue, and Piety, as Christianity thereby now affords us.

2. The Heathens were not alwayes consistent with themselves in their discourses of this nature; their Candle did not only burn dim: But like one in the Socket, it had sometimes its lucid intervals, and then sometimes seem'd to be quite extinguish'd, they had light enough to shew 'em their own darkness, but not sufficient to assure 'em of the right way; the light of their understandings was many time like that of an *ignis fatuus*, desultory and uncertain.

Or if sometimes a more then ordinary Heroick Precept dropt, as it were, from a Pagan penn, yet this will not be sufficient to equal Natural Religion with Christianity, which is a constant, uniform, uninterrupted Series, and Constellation, as it were, of Divine Precepts: One Excellent Precept is not enough to form an institution, especially if we consider, that the influence thereof commonly reach'd no further than the

the particular Sect, by which it was deliver'd, and many times not so far neither, and then the greater quantity of common rubbish, and perhaps vicious mixtures did quite sully the beauty of the celebrated Maxime, and render the influence of it very ineffectual.

3. What ever their notions might be, yet they wanted that which is the very life of all Religion, and the peculiar happiness of Christianity, *viz.* That inward strength, and assistance, which might enable 'em to put their knowledge into practise.

He adds, what exalted thoughts of virtue had *Aristotle*, when he made the very formality of happiness to consist in the exercise of it, *εὐδαιμονία* &c. *Happiness is the act of a rational Soul according to the most perfect virtue in a life most perfect.* I take this, says he, to be the most Noble and Sublime conception of Virtue, that ever was, or can be fram'd by the mind of Man. 'Tis true the Wise Man tells us, *Her ways are ways of pleasantness, and all her paths are peace, that is,* says he, *they are attended with pleasure, and peace:* But that the exercise of virtue should not only be attended with, but be all one with happiness it self, is such a superlative encomium of it, that neither the love, nor contemplation

plation of a *Seraphim* can suggest a greater. Greater things than these cannot be spoken of Thee, O thou City of God! He might as well have gone on, and prefer'd this definition of *Aristotle* above any thing that was ever said, either by our Saviour, or his Apostles, upon this Subject. Christ in his Sermon on the Mount, if he had a mind to have come up to the *Aristotelian* Altitudes, should have given no other reason of the blessedness of such, and such Persons but only because they were such, that is Vertuous. *Blessed are the merciful* because they are merciful, &c. But our Saviour was pleas'd rather to make use of this more humble way, and more accommodated to the State of Mankind, viz. To place the reason of the happiness in the reward.

But suppose I should take the same liberty with *Aristotle*, that he doth with *Solomon*, that is, insert some words into the definition, to make the sense of it more dilute, as *Her ways are ways of pleasantness and all her paths are peace*. That is, says he, attended with pleasure and peace; then *Aristotle* would have no advantage over *Solomon*, but I think there is no need of this: *Aristotle* has done it to my Hand. For first, we may observe, that
in

in the definition it is not said, that the formality of happiness consists in the exercise of virtue, but only that happiness is the Act of the rational Soul according to the most perfect virtue, &c.

2. It is not every virtue, in the exercise, whereof happiness doth consist, but it is the most perfect *ἡ πλεονεξία ἀρετῶν* &c. *Si plures sint virtutes, tunc ex virtute perfectissima.*

3. It must be *ἡ βίη τελείη*. *in vita perfecta* And here he tells us, that as one Swallow makes not spring; *ἡ τὸ ἄνθρωπον* &c. One day, or a short time is not sufficient to make a Man happy: That happiness is founded in virtue, or that a Man cannot be happy without it, is certainly true, but that virtue alone is sufficient to make one so, *Aristotle* himselfe doth not assert. It is generally supposed, that in *βίη τελείᾳ* There must be the concurrence of all outward good things to the consummation of this happiness, 1. Cor. 15. 10. *If in this World only we have hope in Christ, then are we of all Men the most miserable, and yet the Apostles were as happy as virtue could make 'em.*

He proceeds next to compare, and equall Heathens with Christians, as to their practises: I do not say, that an actuall formal

mal intention, of referring all to God, is absolutely necessary, either in Heathens, or Christians, but yet this we may assert, that the nearer we approach thereto, and the more we refer all our actions to the glory of God, the better they are, and come nearer to perfection: I am of his opinion in this, that if a Man do what is agreeable to right reason, because it is agreeable, he does well; tho' perhaps he doth not think of God at that present; provided he has no contrary intention in it. This I believe is true, tho' not for the reason there assign'd: viz. Because he says, to constitute the nature of Sin which is contrary, tis not required that there be an intention of transgressing the dictates of natural reason, much less of offending God. But to this it may be reply'd. 1st. That Vertue and Vice are not, in a strict, and proper sence, contraries, they are only privative opposita. 2^{ly}. Perhaps it is not possible for any one directly, and formally to design the transgression of the Law of Nature, or the Law of God, and yet notwithstanding be guilty of Sin: If the action be in its own nature bad, or if it want any necessary circumstance to make it morally good, it will have the nature, and denomination of an evill action let the intention be what it will. Bo-

num ex causa integrà, malum ex quolibet defectu.

But he is not satisfy'd, unless he bring the Heathens, upon all accounts, to an equal level with Christians, (*sheet B. 3*) tho' *I confess I see no reason why an Heathen may not have this intention, as well as a Christian.* How far an Heathen may sometimes possibly have such an intention, is not my business to dispute; only this I say, that there is this reason, why an Heathen should not have such an intention, *as well as a Christian*, because he has no such plain, and positive Precept in this case. *1 Cor. 10. 31. Whether ye eat, or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God:* and I think I may further observe from this Chapter, that there are not any such plain, and positive commands to be met withal in any Heathen Author, to teach us to use our liberty in things indifferent so, as not to give any just occasion of scandall, or offence to others, as we have laid down in that Chapter; for tho' perhaps there may be something met withal in those which may be Wire drawn as it were, to these purposes, yet probably this was never, either the intent of the Author, or ever so generally understood at that time. Thus much briefly as to that particular.

And

I also humbly conceive, that Mr. Norris, doth too much undervalue Christianity, even as it contains a Doctrine of Morality, when he tells us. *pa. 6. 7. Of his Reason and Faith, that there is nothing in Christianity considerable enough, when the great mysteries of the Trinity, and Incarnation are taken away, to make it appear an Institution worthy of God, or to challenge the assent of any thinking, or considerate Man.* I grant indeed that the mysteries of Christianity do render it more awfull, and venerable, and that more especially upon these two accounts. *1st.* Because they are really true, and not such Phantastickall whimsies, as may be met with all in the *Pagan Theogonia's.* *2d.* They have a natural tendency, either as motives, or arguments, or encouragements, to promote our duties both to God and Man.

But yet is there nothing in that admirable contrivance of the whole? nothing in that exact correspondence, and agreement of the parts of Scripture, tho' writ at several times and upon different occasions? nothing in that *strain* of Divinity, that seemes, as it were, to run thro' all, both Gospels and Epistles meeting in that most exact systeme of Morality, that ever appear'd in the World: nothing in all this worthy of

a Man of clear Ideas, and distinct perceptions to believe or imbrace? Nothing in all this worthy of a rational assent? We have not thus learned Christ.

Since therefore Christianity consists of these two principal parts, Mystery and Morality, and both excellent, and necessary, I think, they ought not to be oppos'd to, or unseasonably compar'd with one another, the Theory, and practice of Religion mutually supporting, and defending each other. Thus that great and Learned Man, the Reverend Bishop of Worcester. *pa. 57. Of his Preface, To his Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity, the principles of Natural Religion, are those that commend Christianity to me, for without them the mysteries of Faith would be far more unaccountable, than now they are, &c.*

And however dismall the fears and jealousies of some Men may be of an universal deluge of Deisme overspreading the World tho' the lives of Men may be generally wicked enough, yet I fancy the age is not ignorant, and weak enough yet for that purpose; for if Men be but either strict in their Lives, or in their reasonings, there will be no great fear of Deisme universally prevailing among 'em; but since it cannot be expected that they generally should

should be so, therefore all ought in their respective stations to oppose the growing evill; yea, even the *State* it selfe ought to have a watchfull eye upon the growth of it, for when Men once arrive at an opinion of indifferency of Religion, they will soon from thence proceed to an indifferency in Government: Yet we ought not in the mean time *desperare, nec de republica nec de Religione.*

Some remarks upon a passage in Dr. Nicholls his Conference with a Deist, pa. 32. 2. part.

I Would not here be thought to take pleasure in finding fault. But this learned Author himselfe has taught me in Dr. *Burnetts*, and Mr. *Whiston's* Case, that 'tis possible for one to differ from another in some particulars without any lessening of their learning, without any Reflection upon their Persons, or without any disparagement of their performances. I perhaps might

Speak as great things in commendation of his Book as he doth of theirs, but it doth not stand in need of the approbation of one of so mean a Character, yet I hope I may without offence make use of that modest liberty, which he takes in the like case.

Some are only for naturall Religion, not granting any to be reveal'd; others are all for reveal'd Religion, not granting any, in a strict and proper sense, to be Naturall; and I wish that some ill minded Men be not apt from hence (occasion being thus given by dashing these assertions one against another) to conclude, that there is no such thing, as any religion at all. But I think the heat of opposing Deisme proceeds too far, when Men in defence of the reveal'd Religion, deny the natural, for the granting of the one, is so far from being any prejudice to the other, that those two seem rather mutually to support, and defend each other.

This learned Author in the place above cited tells us, *that the common Rules of Morality, which we generally call Natural Religion, were at first reveal'd by God, and tis very odd he says to think how such propositions as these, Parents are to be honoured, friends assisted, &c. How these pro-*
positions

positions, which are the complication of so many distinct, and simple Ideas, which we are sure are generally attained by reason, and experience should yet be asserted to come into the minds by such an unaccountable way, as that of Inscription; But here I would ask this learned Author, whether it be possible for God to inscribe such propositions as these upon the minds of Men (I do not mean in any gross or literal sense) if it be (and I think I may challenge any one to prove the impossibility of it) yet still we might urge the same difficulty against 'em, *Viz.* That these propositions are only the complications of so many distinct and simple Ideas which we get by experience, so that this is only such an objection as may be consistent with an acknowledg'd truth, and therefore indeed is none at all. I do not here suppose the simple Ideas of Parents, and Honour, of Friends, &c. to be inscrib'd by God, and yet the truth of those propositions may be truly said to be so, but I shall refer the Reader to what I have further said upon this particular, in Answer to Mr. Lock.

As for Dr. Nicholls his Argument drawn from the poor *honest Indian*, I think is so far good as to prove, that he did not come to the knowledge of those noti-

ons of honesty, and fidelity by any such profound ratiocination, to which some Men would ascribe the Original of all those moral duties. But whether he came to them by Tradition, or Instruction from his Father may be justly question'd, because they who have liv'd long and conversed much with those *Indians*, do find that it comes as little into the Parents minds to instruct their Children in the principles of morality, as it does come into the Children's to make any diligent enquiry into the nature of it themselves. So that tho' that learned Author doth say that that opinion of Innate notions has been of late generally Exploded by learned Men; yet I think it still stands upon an equall level of probability with either of the other *viz.* Either Ratiocination, or Tradition, consider'd singly by themselves.

I do not here go about absolutely to oppose this way of Tradition, *Valeat quantum valere potest*, but yet I would not lay the whole stress of the cause upon it; so as to deprive our selves of any advantage that may accrue to us by either of the other, in the defence of our common cause of Religion, either by rational deduction, or Natural inscription; Orall Tradition having not found that good success in the World, as to Divinity, as much to encourage

courage others to urge, or to prosecute the same in morality.

But he says, that *tho' relations of matters of fact, ancient customs, and difficult articles of Faith, may suffer much by being convey'd this way, &c.* But was not Gods instructing *Adam* in these things, matter of fact? Or may not matters of Fact done by God be misrepresented as well, as those done by Men? As for difficult Articles of Faith, if he mean such as are of a more complex nature, and include a long series of propositions, or if he supposes this Tradition to extend to the modes, and circumstances of things, then this way might be very lyable to mistake, and corruption by passing through so many hands; but suppose God had taught *Adam* to believe a Trinity in the God-head, the Resurrection of the Body, without the respective modes of either, I doe not see but that these might as safely, and securely have been delivered down to posterity, as those other precepts he mentions; but these *plain Rules of morality, he says, such as worship God, Honour thy Parents, &c. Are so natural to the understanding, so easy to be imbraced by it and appear upon proposal to be so extreamly usefull to Mankind, &c.* Here he seemes to relinquish his own principle, *Tradition*, and to found the

belief and ready reception of these rules of Morallity in their being so natural to the understanding, &c. *That they must be assented to, and can never be mistaken, or forgot.* But pa. 33. he tells us, *that there are some very barbarous People, who, we are very certain, want most of these Moral Notions,* so that here must have been some mistake, or forgetfulness on some hand, or other. But he says, Pa. 37. *If Morality was inscrib'd on Mens hearts, Parents might with as much wisdom pretend to teach their Children to eat, and drink, to love their Children, &c.* So that it seems, there is such a Natural Duty, or instinct for Parents to love their Children *that they cannot but do it.* But why is not the Duty reciprocal? Why may not Children be, in the same way, bound to honour their Parents, as Parents to love their Children? and yet he says, Pa. 72. *That among the ancient Heathens it was a common thing to throw their Children when born into the next ditch, they met with.* No great Argument of such a Natural Love and Affection towards 'em, as they could not but shew and exercise: Pa. 33, he tells us, 'tis odd to think, that these Propositions should come into the minds of Men by such an unaccountable way, as that of Inscription, and yet he says Pa. 92. *That Gods permission*
of

of Vice is no sign of his liking it, he having otherwise declar'd his will, by giving to all Men a Law of Vertue. This cannot be understood of the traditionary Law, because that has not, by some defect or other, extended to all Men.

Pa. 38. *Tis further remarkable, that Parents Dent. 6. 6. are commanded by God to teach their Children these Moral Dutys: But what then? Did ever any body assert, that this Natural Inscription doth supersede the necessity of other Instructions, or the use of those other means which God, and Nature have made requisite in order to the more perfect knowledge of our Dutys? But after the recital of the Ten Commandments, viz. The Moral Law, Moses adds, and these words, which I command Thee this day shall be in thy heart, and thou shalt teach them diligently to thy Children, &c. But these words were not introduc'd immediately after the recital of the Ten Commandments. The ten Commandments were recited about the middle of the 5th. Chap. and v. 31. God there speaking to Moses, says, Stand thou here by me, and I will speak unto thee all the Commandments, and Statutes and Judgments, which thou shalt teach them, that they may do them in the Land, which I give them to possess it; Now these words, Commandments, Statute*

Statutes, and Judgments, are generally understood to signifie all the Precepts of the Moral, Ceremonial, and Judicial Law, and certainly the Jewes were oblig'd to observe some other Laws, besides the Ten Commandments, in the Land which the Lord gave 'em to possess it: The like words are repeated. Ch. 6. 1. Whereupon v. 6. it follows, These words which I command thee this day shall be in thy heart.

He proceeds, 'Tis further remarkable, that what Moses here says, shall be in the Jewes hearts, the Apostle says Rom. 2. 15. was written in the Gentiles hearts, so that unless there can be a substantial difference evinc'd between being in the heart, and written there, all the Doctrine of inscrib'd Propositions falls to the ground. I perceiue that those who are any ways concern'd for the Doctrine of Inscrib'd Propositions; must either now speak, or else for ever hereafter hold their peace. But to this I answer,

1. That if that expression of *Moses*, of *Being in their hearts*, relate only to the Ten Commandments. viz. the Moral Law. Why then may not *Moses* be as well explain'd by *St. Paul*, as *St. Paul* by *Moses*; and so Natural inscription be understood by both?
2. I know not whether I can show a substantial

stantial difference betwixt those expressions, or no, yet I hope, I shall show such an one, as may be sufficient to satisfy any impartial and considerate Reader.

1 *Moses* and *St. Paul* do not speak *Secundum idem*, or *ad idem*. *Moses* speaks of the Precepts of all the three Laws, *Moral*, *Ceremonial*, and *Judicial*, *St. Paul* only of the *Moral*.

2. They do not speak, *Eodem modo*. *Moses's* expression of *being in their hearts*, according to the best Interpreters, signifies no more, than being in their Memory's, and affections, *St. Paul's being written in their hearts*, signifies something more as supposing the Gentiles *naturally* conscious of the observation and breach of the Moral Law; So that I humbly conceive, there can be no Argument drawn from the comparing those two places of *Moses* and *St. Paul* in prejudice to the Doctrine of Natural Inscriptions, rightly understood.

Pa. 129, No body says, that God reveals these Natural truths to us, but only gives us faculties of discerning them.

And may not the same be said of some Moral truths which we commonly call *Natural Religion*, that God does not reveal these truths to us, but only gives us faculties, by vertue whereof we may either find, or frame such propositions as are agreeable to

to the morral, as well as to the Natural frame, and constitution of the Soul? I cannot too often remind the Reader that I never asserted these Natural, or Innate notions to be imprinted upon the mind *in any gross, or litterall sense*, upon which mistaken Ground, and perswasion only, I am apt to believe that they are oppos'd by some, Pa. 83. Of my former discourse, there speaking of the Archetypall formes, and patterns of all truth in the Divine intellect; *These I say, are communicated to the soul in a way and proportion suteable to such a being, that is, they are either made Naturall propertyes of its being, as such, or the necessary, and immediate result of its faculties, in the right use, and exercise of em*,

For it is not easie to conceive how either any sensible impressions from without, or any reflections of the Soul upon its own operations (*about those impressions*) can be connatural causes of morall truths.

I grant indeed, that vertue has a natural tendency to promote both publick, and private interest, but yet I think the Soul finds, as it were, an intrinsick suteableness of these truths to it selfe, and of it self to them, antecedently to any such external considerations.

Some

*Some Remarks upon Mr. Chauvin
de Religione Naturali.*

ONE designe of his Book, he tells us, was *Orthodoxarum Ecclesiarum fratres ad concordiam vocare*. An excellent design this, and worthy to be prosecuted with all the prudence, and pious Zeall, that the thing is capable of, but it is to be wish'd, that he had brought a more humble, and modest temper of mind to such a work, as this; it did not become him, to reflect unhanfomly upon the constitution, and government of that Church, which both as to Doctrine, and Discipline comes the nearest to that of the Primitive, of any in the Christian World: It is not for private Persons, much less for Strangers, and Forraigners to prescribe new formes, and methods to a Church that has been so long, and so well constituted, as this has been; when this Gentleman has more fully considered

sidered, and better understood things of this nature, he will be better satisfy'd with some of our Ecclesiastical constitutions, than at present he seems to be.

I shall not presume to take notice of any thing in his Epistle Dedicatory, because it is to a learned and Reverend Bishop of our own Church; tho' withall, I believe, there are some things in it writ without his knowledge, or approbation. But least my charge here against him might seem too general, and so groundless; I shall instance in one particular, *pa* 419. Where he unhanfomly and rudely reflects upon our *Convocations*.

But these are things above my sphere, but under the carefull, and watchfull Eye of our Superiours.

My design here is of a lower nature, *Pa. 131, Nobis jam ostendendum est, quâ viâ, illa lex, quæ naturalis dicitur, in corda nostra irrepserit, utrum nempe naturaliter sit menti nostræ inscripta, quod vulgo asseritur, nos vero Evidenter asserimus, illud esse falsissimum.* A little more Evidence in the proof, tho' less in the assertion, might do very well: But here it will be very difficult to reconcile this Author, either to Scripture, or to himself. St. Paul tells us, *Rom. 2. 15. That the Gentiles show the work of the Law* (that

is, the *Naturall Law*) written in their hearts. Now it must be granted, that this Natural inscription, even à *primo ortu*, is the most plaine, and obvious interpretation of the place, and where that may be retained, we ought not to look for another: And tho' tis true, that the Natural Law is agreeable to the dictates of reason it self, when come to perfect maturity, yet if this had been all the Apostle designed to express; I am apt to believe, he would not have thus worded it, by being written in their hearts; for by thus doing, he did almost inevitably, and invincibly confirm Men in that false opinion (if it be one) which was then more generally received in the World. Nor can any argument be drawn from the word *λόγισμοι* in the following part of the Verse, in prejudice of this opinion of Natural inscription. Dr. Hammond, here tells us that these *λόγισμοι* are practi-
cally *νοήσας ἐννοήσας*, common notions of good and evill, which are among the generality of Men, even Heathens, without any light from the *Mosaicall Law*, &c.

I shall now see how difficult it is to reconcile him to himself in other places, *pa.* 5. There speaking of the belief of a Deity he tells us, *Consentanea utiq; est illis connaturalibus rationis principijs, quæ nobis insunt,*

Et paulatim augeſcunt Pa. 38. *quid nobis eſſe debet antiquius, quam religio, quæ ſi verum fatearis, inſculpta fuerat, in hominum mentibus.* Pa. 45. ſpeaking of the belief of the Unity of a God, *hæc opinio demonſtrat naturæ rudera, quæ in imis illorum medullis, infixæ ſunt, nec ullâ de cauſa poſſunt amoveri.* I might eaſily tyre my ſelf and Reader too in citing places to this purpoſe, in favour of theſe natural principles, which ſeem even at firſt implanted in the minds of Men, tho' it cannot be expected they ſhould ſhow themſelves, before the actual uſe of reaſon.

I ſhall now briefly examine the reaſons he gives of his opinion; if, ſays he, the Law of Nature, be writ by the finger of God upon the hearts of Men à primo ortu then it muſt be either to direct us to good, or to deter us from evil, but it cannot ſerve for either of theſe: Not the firſt, *nam ubi omnia ſunt turbata* &c. Where all things are diſturb'd, and out of order by reaſon of the tenderneſs, and weakneſs of Age, altogether unfit for prudence, there the Voice of the Law cannot be heard. But will he argue barely from the Laws not being heard, that therefore there is none? We commonly ſay, that in war the Laws are ſilent, or howſoever cannot be heard and

and yet they are Laws even there too: If he supposes us in the state of Infancy, before the use of reason, what should he talk of the rules of good, and evil to such, as know neither? If he supposes us in the State of juvenility, tho' our passions be strong, and turbulent, yet methinks, there should be more need at such a time, more especially, of a Law to direct us.

Nor, 2dly, Says he, *can it deter us from evil*, because there is no actual sin in Children before the use of Reason, but would it be in vain to have this Law imprinted upon the minds of Children, because they cannot yet make use of it? May not the the Soul of a Child properly be call'd a rational Soul, tho' as yet it cannot form a Syllogism? may there not be natural inclinations, and dispositions to truth, and holyness. Some *semina vite moralis*, tho' these do not show themselves until such prefixt times, as Providence and the nature of things have appointed for 'em? And till this be prov'd either absolutely impossible, or highly irrational, the opposers of these natural Principles do prove nothing to their purpose, nor gain any strength or credit to their cause.

2. Another ground of his Opinion is drawn from a parity of reason *betwixt faith,*
and

and this Law of Nature, there being he says, the same reason for both, *quoniam ut ambe, fides & lex jure suo utantur, necessario debent unà cum intellectu voluntatis actus eximios exerere.* But I do not see how there can be any necessary Argument drawn from the one to the other, the one being purely Natural, the other supernatural, and Similitudes may indeed sometimes illustrate, but never necessarily prove any thing.

He tell us indeed Pa. 333. *Maximi viri his novissimis temporibus evidenter probaverunt, &c. That great Men of late dayes have evidently provd, that neither faith nor sēmen fidei, is in us from our Infancy:* I do indeed believe, that it was in these latter dayes, that such novel Doctrine, as this was Preach'd; who he means by his *viri maximi* I know not, but I am apt to believe, that their authority is not indisputable; and it will be very difficult for him, or for any else, who resumes the dispute, to prove, that there is not at least, a *sēmen fidei*, that is, an inward principle of Divine grace, so far as to regenerate the Infant, convey'd in Baptism: And therefore I wonder why he should call that an obsolete opinion, because perhaps some Modern French Divines have been against it. *ut si vulgo omnes, ac presertim Seneca, de virtutum*

tutum seminibus loquuti sunt, distinctam sanctorum dictorum notitiam non habuerunt.

It is an easy way of confuting those, who differ from us, to tell 'em, as it is an usual custom now a days, that they have no distinct Idea, or clear perception of what they say. But a greater degree of Modesty might very well become a greater Man than himself.

It is very strange, that God, who at first created Man after his own Image, ~~that he~~ should not make, as it were, one actual stroke either of truth, or holyness upon his Soul, wherein if in any thing, he might much more especially resemble his Creator. So likewise in his new Creation, or spiritual regeneration, which is generally I think, suppos'd to be begun in Baptism, that he should do nothing by way of actual conveyance of grace, and strength, as an inward principle.

Here I beg the Readers Pardon, If I so far digress, as briefly to examine, what the Reverend Author of the Catechetical Lectures has laid down in his 70th. Pa. Vol. 1st. Relating hereunto. *All, who are the Children of God, either in the sense of the Scripture, or of the Catechism, are not thus actually Regenerated.* Here the question is not to what degree they are regenerated in Baptism

tism, but whether they be really Regenerate, or no. No one can here imagine, that Children should be so Regenerate in Baptism, as that they should be able to perform all the Offices, and Duties of Christianity, as adult Persons doe.

As to the *Sence of Scripture* he says, it is, *plain, that every one that beares the relation of a Child of God, is not dutifull to his Father which is in Heaven*: No one ever doubted this: But will it thence follow, that even such an one was not once a true Child of God, and regenerated in Baptism; may not Men put themselves out of that state of Salvation, wherein once they were, by their gross and willfull Sins? But then further, every degree of Undutifulnes is not inconsistent with a Regenerate state; indeed upon every commission of sin, we ought to return again to God by repentance, and reformation for the time to come, yet every particular Sin, doth not put a true Child of God into a state of damnation:

And as to the *meaning of a child of God in the Catechisme*. it is plain, that it is not only such, as are renew'd in the spirit of their minds, and imitate God, that are here to be understood, for every one that is Catechised is requir'd to answer, that in his Baptisme

he

he was made a Child of God, whereas many Catechumens are not yet renewed and really converted. To this I Answer.

1st. That these two expressions, of being renewed in their minds, and imitating of God are not here well joyned together, because Children may be so renewed in their Spirits as to be really regenerated, and yet not to be in a condition of actually imitating of God. 2. Catechumens are indeed required to Answer so; neither doth our Church herein require 'em to tell a lye for so they were made the Children of God, and that by true and reall regeneration (I still insist upon that Word, because our Church asserts it) tho' our Reverend, and learned Author doth suppose, that many Catechumens were never yet actually renewed in the Spirit of their minds, or regenerated, and many never will be. Which makes Baptisme a more insignificant thing, than either Scripture, or the Church of England ever design'd to make it. But why may not the Catechumen truly say, that in Baptism he was made a Child of God, more than by a mere Covenant-relation, viz. By the laver of Regeneration Tit. 3. 5. and why may we not charitably, and truly too suppose the Catechumen by the blessing of God upon a Christian

Edu-

education, still to have the seed of Baptifmal grace remaining in him, which we firmly believe God at first bestowed upon him? for our Church tells us, that Infants dying before the commiffion of fin, are certainly faved, and yet this we know, that nothing impure, or unholy can enter into that ftate: But he proceeds.

So that a Child of God by Spirituall regeneration, and God-like imitation exprefs rather a duty what every one ought to be, than, &c. By God-like imitation, I fuppose, he meanes a pious imitation of God, tho' I do not know, whether that expreffion will bear it, or no :

But then let us apply what he here fays to the Office of Baptifm, and fee what fenfe it will make, when we Pray that the *Child then comeing to Chrifts holy Baptifm may receive remiffion of his Sins by Spirituall regeneration*; this is not to be understood of any thing then actually to be received at Baptifm, but at a certain critical moment of Conversion fome Years after, if perhaps fuch a thing ever happen at all; and whereas in the laft prayer of that Office it is faid, *We yeild The hearty thanks moft mercifull Father, that it hath pleased thee to Regenerate this Infant with thy*

thy holy Spirit; This must be understood so, as that he is only at present put into a capacity of being Regenerated hereafter. But he that thus explains the Catechism must at the same time destroy the Office of Baptism, which is of equall Authority with the other, but the Doctrine of the Church of England is not inconsistent with it self, if Men do not come with prejudice, and prepossession to the explication of it: And tho' he tells us, Pa. 60. *That this matter was rightly stated by one thus;* that is in a way suitable to his own opinion, yet I believe; upon examination, neither His Authority, nor his reasons would be found of any great force.

I shall only further take notice of one question and Answer in the Catechism. *Doest thou not think, that thou art bound to believe and do as they have promis'd for thee?* Ans: Yes verily; and by Gods help so I will; and I heartily thank our Heavenly Father, that he hath called me to this state of Salvation thro' Jesus Christ our Saviour. Now a state of Salvation is certainly something more, than a mere federal Relation. And I pray unto God, to give me his grace, that I may continue in the same to my Lifes end. But this learned Author says, that all Catechumens are not Converted or Regenerated, and some by
 H their

their own fault never will be, but certainly it would be the greatest curse imaginable to teach a Child to pray, that he may remain in a state of unregeneration.

The Reverend Dr. doth not take the least notice of this part of that Answer in his explanation of it, so that I do not certainly know what his particular sentiments are herein.

It is to on purpose to tell us, that it is not easily conceiveable how Children can be regenerate in Baptism, since the Scripture doth warrant it, and the Church affirms it; perhaps it would be difficult for them to explain the manner how adult Persons are Regenerate. *John, 3. 8. The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but thou knowest not whence it come thand whether it goeth, So is every one that is born of the Spirit.*

But to return from this digression.

He urges further, *cuj tandem bono indulgetur nobis illa naturalis lex, &c.* Is it that there might be some previous dispositions in the Soul by degrees to dispose it to better obedience to its precepts? Let us suppose this for once, and see what Answer he returns unto it. He tells us, that these previous dispositions to virtue are things
alto-

altogether as unintelligible as *Aristotle's* substantial forms, which lye hid, no body knows how, in the bosom of the matter, till at last they show themselves in their proper shapes: But here he seemes again, *Eadem Chordâ oberrare*, before heargu'd from supernatural things to Natural, now he argues from Physical to things of a moral and more immaterial nature. *Aristotle's* substantial forms are unintelligible, *ergo* the Law of Nature is so too, for they are as like one another, as ever they can look, for like as substantial forms lye hid in *matter*, till they find, or take occasion of coming out, so these Natural principles do just the same, in reference to the Soul. This indeed is evident affirmation, but I see little of proof in it. There are indeed real difficulties, and absurditys urg'd against *substantial forms*; but I know none against these Natural notions in the sence before asserted: All that seems to be materially objected against this natural inscription, is, that there is, they say, no need of it in order, either to the knowledge of truth, or obligation to duty, these, they say, may be accounted for other ways: But supposing this for once to be true, but not granting it to be so, this is no argument against what is here asserted, *viz*, Natural Inscription; for what if God should

afford us more ways in order to the coming to the knowledge of truth, and goodness, then we fancy to be absolutely necessary, have we any reason to blame providence for it? But he tells us *Pa.* 336.

&c. That the Soul doth make certain Aphorisms, or generall Rules, for the direction of humane Life, *Post maturam tandem experientiam* : After mature experience. Such as these, *Honestum vitio ac libidini esse preferendum, &c.* Which afterwards he calls *generalis norma de honesto apud homines stabilita.*

But I would only ask him, in what place and in what Age it was, that Men thus generally met to determine, and fix the Rules of right and wrong, by a general consent : For a further answer hereto, I shall refer my Reader to my former discourse of *humane nature*, *Pa.* 54.

There is one thing more, wherein this Gentleman seems to affect some kind of peculiarity, tho' I think it is rather in expression, than in notion : That the Christian Religion, especially as to the Dutys of it, are no ways contrary to Natural reason, but highly agreeable thereunto is certainly true, and tends much to the honour, and reputation of Christianity.

But then why we should so far strain the common sence, and acceptation of the word
Natural,

Natural, as to apply it to all the mysteries and miracles of our Religion, I do not understand. We have sufficient reason from the nature of God, and from Divine Revelation to believe all the instituted parts of Christianity, but I know no reason why we should assert the Naturalness of em', if I may so speak. But he designs here to advance a seeming paradox, *pa. 263. Quoniam res videtur ardua, & firme inaudita, pa. 248. grandia suscipimus cum omnes, quotquot vidimus sunt huic opinioni oppositi, ut qui maxime.* He makes use indeed of a peculiar way of speaking, but when he has explain'd what he means by it, and in what sense he understands it, the notion is common, and ordinary. *per naturam intelligo rectam rationem, usum, & morem hominum communem, & tandem traditionem receptam. Pa, 264.* a very large acceptation of *Nature*.

If God has adapted some of his institutions, either to the custom of former Ages, or to the apprehensions of Mankind, we have so much more reason to acknowledg his condescension to our infirmities, but we have none from hence to call em' *Natural*. *Pa. 271. nec communi usui aut rerum natura adversantur seu miracula, seu prophetiae Jesu Christi.* One might almost think here, that he asserted *Spinoza's* opinion, that

miracles were not above nor contrary to Nature, but his meaning is more innocent, he only means that Miracles were pretended to by other Religions, and that they were made use of by Christ, *in nature restorationem* for the benefit of Mankind and the support of humane Nature. Pa. 286. There he tells us, that *even Evangelical Faith it self doth no way interfere with his former Doctrine.* But his Reason seems very strange, and not much for the honour of Christianity, *sed si nos ipsos consulamus, comperiemus corda nostra spontè patere anilibus fabulis ut qui credulitati naturâ nostrâ obnoxij simus, &c.*

It were to be wish'd that Men would express common thoughts in a common and ordinary way: But some Men think to gain to themselves the Reputation of great Notionalists, by dressing up common and ordinary Notions in a new form of words, thus seeming to speak something great, and above the ordinary pitch of other Men, when many times there is very little, or nothing in their pompous ways of speaking.

If the learned Author of the Catechetical Lectures hath in any other part of his Book (which yet I have not met with) explained the point before mentioned in a
way

way agreeable to the Office of Baptism, I then recall what I have said upon that particular, only, I could have wish'd that he had not given that occasion to others of misapprehending him.

Some Remarks upon Monsieur Malebranch his Opinions of the non-efficiency of Second Causes, and of seeing all things in God.

THE true liberty of Philosophizing, and the free and ingenuous use of a Mans own Reason, is certainly a very great perfection of a Rational creature, a just freedom of thinking together with that of choice, being two great prerogatives of humane nature; but the best things may be abused, and perverted to bad purposes, thus Men sometimes, under the plausible pretence of free thinking, give their fancies leave

to Roave about for new Opinions, and then presently are so enamour'd of their own inventions, that it is very difficult, if at all possible, even to convince 'em of the contrary, and that which more confirms them in their own way, is, that they fancy themselves the only Men, that enjoy the true genius of contemplation, and those who differ from 'em and cannot assent to their way of reasoning, they look upon to be Men, whose understandings are cramped by the prejudice of an unhappy Education.

Here I shall propound these two things to Consideration

1. No Opinion in Philosophy is either to be rejected or embraced merely upon account of its Antiquity or novelty, but only, as it comes attended, or not attended with the Evidence of reason and probability at least of truth, thus a more true genius of Philosophizing may appear in the defence of an old truth, than in the asserting of a new error.

2. In things purely Physicall, relating to things meerely of a material Nature, we may indulge a greater liberty of thinking but in things that terminate more immediately upon God, as this Opinion of *Monſieur Malbranch* does, in seeing all things in God, in such I conceive, we ought to

be

be more wary, and guide both our Thoughts, and Words with greater caution.

There are some positive Moralists, if I may so call 'em, such who tell us, that there is nothing good, or evill in its own nature, but that things are so *ut non quia*, only because of the positive decree, and determination of God, that they should be so: *Monsieur Malbranch* seemes in some respect, to be the same in *Natural Philosophy*, that those others are in *Moral*, that is, he grants no Natural efficiency to 2d. Causes, and that they are only signes, and occasions upon which God will, and without which he will not produce such effects. Thus what *Mr. Norris, Pa. 59. Of his Remarks upon the Athenian Society*, says concerning sensible impressions in respect of Ideas, may be said of all other causes, that God has established a certain Order, or connexion betwixt such impressions made upon our senses, and such Ideas, not that these impressions doe cause, or produce these Ideas, but that they are conditions, upon the presence of which God will raise them, or to speak more properly, exhibit them to our minds.

Now according to this Hypothesis if God had ordered things so at first, or shall hereafter do so, then the running of a feather thro' never so lightly over a Mans hand,

might have caus'd the most exquisite pain imaginable; then *Tentorden Steeple* might have been as much the cause of *Goodwins Sands*, as any second cause is of the effect, which yet seems to follow from it. But then if we consider what he sayes, *pa. 116.* of his *Illustrations*, he there seems not much to differ from the common Hypothesis, *ad deum seu ad causam Universalem, ubi effectuum, specialium ratio postulatur, recurrendum non esse fateor*, but withall he says, *naturæ investigatio fallax & omnino vana, ubi in eâ, aliæ veræ causæ quærentur, quàm voluntates omnipotentis*: Again in the same place, *si fieri possit, effectuum, de quibus agitur, causa naturalis & specialis est explicanda*, but again he says, *actio istarum causarum consistit duntaxat in vi movente, quâ agitantur; illa vero vis movens nihil aliud est, quàm ipsa dei voluntas*.

But it is no great sign of truth; or of a good Cause when its Patron seems, as it were, thus oppress'd by its weight and thus operosely labours in the explication of it.

But its observable, that he himself grants that it would be more agreeable, if it could be done, to assigne special natural causes of particular effects. But now would it not be more Philosophical, to say, that there

there are such particuliar causes in Nature, tho' at present we are not able to assign 'em, then thus to run to the more immediate power of God for the salving of every ordinary Phænomenon of Nature. I grant that it is very difficult to assign the just limits betwixt Natural, and Supernatural power, to determine justly where the one ends, and the other begins, or indeed fully to explain all the modes of Natural Phænomena's, but yet, methinks, it is not altogether so Philosophycal, to ascribe these, (commonly reputed) ordinary Phænomena's of gravitation, for example, or the growing of a pile of Grass to the constant efficiency, or Supernatural influence of almighty God. I do not say, that we are able to give a full solution of these things, as to all the minutest circumstances of 'em, nor would I ascribe too much to Natural causes, but yet I think, presently to have recourse to Divine power, for the solution of all things; this would damp all our further enquiries into Nature, which is an employment very worthy of a rational Creature, (provided it does not extend too far, I mean, to the excluding of providence out of the World) besides to ascribe all things immediately to God, exclusively of second causes, might perhaps seem to detract from the true Notion

tion and nature of providence it self in that just, and wise order of things, in that exact harmony betwixt the Natural and moral World, which God has constituted in the Universe: And it would be difficult to give any tolerable account, *worthy of the wisdom of God*; of those things, commonly call'd second causes, if they be but bare signes, or conditions of those things, which they seem to have some causal influence upon.

But he tells us, *Pa. 124.* Of his Illustrations, (which I should have mentioned before) *cum voluntas mea determinat voluntatem dei, certe brachium meum movebitur non voluntate mea, quæ inefficax est per se, sed voluntate dei, quæ effectu suo nunquam frustratur.*

But why should he call the will of Man *Inefficax*, when at the same time he tells us that it determines the will of God? Might not Mans will, if God had so pleas'd, as well determine the motion of his own Arme, as determine the will of God? And I do not yet see, how he has prov'd Gods pleasure to be otherwise. Neither will those words *per se* do him any service, for nobody asserts second causes to have any power of themselves, but what they receiv'd from the first. I do not dispute the powerful efficiency of the Divine will, where-
ever

ever God is pleas'd to employ it, only if our Adversaries will grant any subordinate causality to second causes, but still in dependance upon, and under the direction of the first cause, I shall not dispute about the *Quantum*.

But the *Monsieur* betakes himself to his modish way of fencing with Ideas. *Voluntatem meam producere Ideas meas, nego, quia ne quidem capio quo modo illas possit producere*; But may not I deny Mans will to determine Gods will, for the same reason *quia ne quidem capio*, &c. How my will can determine Gods will? And some few lines after, he says, *nemo habet claram Ideam hujus virtutis mentis in corpus & corporis in mentem, qui id positive asserunt, non satis assequeuntur, quid dicunt*. But may we not both by reason, and experience, know something to be true, of which we have no clear and distinct Idea, as to the manner of 'em?

But tho' I am apt to believe that there are some things in Nature yet unknown to us, which afterwards shall be, and others which never will be known in this State, which yet in the other we shall then see Natural causes of, yet I would not have any to infer from hence, that I in the least go about to lessen the credit of Divine miracles

miracles, as if there were not sufficient grounds to satisfy any rational Man of the truth, and reality of those miracles wrought by *Moses*, Our Saviour and his Apostles, *viz.* To prove, that they were, both above the power of Nature, or any diabolical Arts, to perform, which will appear hence, because no doubt the Devil had his Instruments, both under the Old, and New Testament, who evry well understood the powers of Nature, and their own, and would certainly make use of the same to their utmost possibility in opposing the Religion, that was then to be established, and yet we find they were never able to contend with these Divine workers of Miracles, with any success.

And if we further consider, the intrinsic nature of the things themselves, if we consider the end and design of these Miracles which were always done in confirmation of a Doctrine truly Divine, and in pity, and compassion to the Souls; and Bodies of Men, never for popular applause, or vaine ostentation, if we consider lastly the manner of their being done, by a bare Word, where the thing was no sooner said than done, tho' at great distance too, from all these things we must necessarily conclude these Miracles to be truly Divine, and

and now for a Man, after all this, to urge that we know not how far the powers of Nature may extend, and whether these may not come within this compass, is rather to play the Sceptick, then the Phylosopher. *Vide. Preface to Amyraldus of Divine Dreams Sheet, C*

Tho' I do not see any inconveniency at all in asserting the deluge to have happen'd by the concurrence of second causes, but still under the influence, and direction of Divine providence. I know its here objected, that if it came to pass by Natural causes then there must have been a Deluge whether the former World had been so wicked, or no. Then *Noah's* Preaching had been all Collusion, and if the World had Repented, yet it could not have escap'd the punishment. To this I Answer. 1st. That the force of these Objections, if perhaps there be any in them, consists in this, *Viz.* The supposal that these Second causes are not under the influence and direction of Divine providence. 2. If we could well suppose that actually to come to pass which God certainly foresaw would never come to pass, that is, the Antediluvian World had repented, how do they come to know that it would have perish'd notwithstanding? Could not God as well save

Save the rest of the World by some extraordinary manner, as he sav'd *Noah*, and his Family in an ordinary one? But a right notion of Divine prescience will perfectly solve all these seeming difficulties, and here I premise.

1. That Gods Fore-knowledge is of as large an extent, as all the possible actions of the most free agents, he foresees that Man might have done this, or that, and yet he certainly sees, that he will freely chuse this.

2. God's fore-knowledge of things to come doth not lay any necessity upon the things fore-seen, antecedently to the event, neither will it hence follow, that God's fore-knowledge might have been here frustrated, if things might have fallen out otherwise, because God did also foresee this possibility too, and yet he saw, that notwithstanding they would certainly fall out thus.

Now let us apply this to the present case. God fore-saw that the *Antide-luvian* World would be so preverfly wicked, not withstanding all the means he should use in order to their Reformation: He then order'd such a constitution and frame of things, such an harmony betwixt the Natural and Moral World, that Nature it
self

self should be instrumental for the punishment of Mens wickedness; and that without any violation of the Divine mercy and justice, and in a way agreeable to its own Laws: This seems to tend much to the honour of Divine providence, and no ways contrary to any of Gods attributes. Therefore it is no good way of Arguing, that if the Deluge did come to pass by the concurrence of Second Causes, then it would have happen'd, whether the World had been so wicked, or no, because the constitution of such a frame of Nature did suppose the certainty of its being wicked, and yet without laying any necessity at all of its being so.

I shall now proceed to his other Opinion, of seeing all things in God. *pa. 208. Lat Edit.* But here also there seems to be some kind of uncertainty, or obscurity in stating of the Question, so that his Notions seem not here to lye very cleare in his Head, *pa. 211.*

Deus non potest facere mentem ad cognoscenda opera sua, nisi mens illa videat aliquo modo deum, videndo ipsius opera; adeo ut dicere possimus, quod si Deum aliquo modo non videremus, nihil prorsus videremus.

But this cannot be so understood, that by seeing the Works of God, we thereby only come to the knowledge of his Attributes,

of

of power, wisdom, and goodness; something more than this, is intimated thro' the whole series of his Hypothesis: But then tho' we thus, some way or other see God, yet we do not see his Essence, *pa. 209. Inferendum non est, mentes videre Essentiam dei, ex eo quod omnia in deo videant, eo quo diximus modo, quia id quod vident est valde imperfectum, deus vero perfectissimus.*

Now it is not easily conceivable, how we can see God, and yet neither see him by his Essence, nor his Attributes.

And in the same place he says, *præterquam quod dicere possumus nos non tam videre Ideas rerum, quam res ipsæ, quæ Ideæ representantur*: And yet Mr. Norris, *pa. 203.* Of his Reason and Religion, tells us, that those Ideas which are in God are the very Ideas which we see, and the immediate objects of our knowledge, and perception.

However if we see all things in God by his exhibiting to us the Ideas that are in himself, how comes he so variously to represent them to several Men? I doe not now speak of the Objects, of sense, but of moral, and intellectual objects, so that there are very few Men of the same opinion in things of this Nature: The union, that Monsieur Malbr talks of, betwixt the will

will of Man, and Gods representation of Ideas will not do it, for however short Men may come, as to the attainment, yet certainly all Men desire to see the exact truth of things: If it be here said, that the preception of truth depends upon the various tempers, dispositions and qualifications of the minds, it meets withal, this I doe not deny; but then this is that which seems more agreeable to the other hypothesis, this assertion being not so well consistent with that exhibitiveway of seeing all things in God, upon our desiring to see 'em.

Monsieur Malbr. reckons up Five several ways of Solving the mode of humane understanding, the Four first he confutes, and rejects, as unreasonable, and impossible to solve the *Phænomena's* of Sensation and understanding, the Fifth, *viz.* That of seeing all things in God, he asserts and defends. I shall not here dispute, whether he has fully answered the Four first or no, but supposing he had, yet it will not necessarily follow, that the Fifth is *sufficiently establish'd by the overthrow of the First.* as Mr. Norris tells us. *pa. 194. Of Reason and Religion.*

For 1st. What necessity is there, that the mode of Humane understanding should be thus.

thus fully explain'd at all? Why may not this, as well as the union of the Soul and Body, remain a *Phenomenon* not yet explain'd, and perhaps not explicable? 2. Perhaps *Monsieur Malbr.* has not made a sufficient enumeration, why may there not be yet another way, besides those he there mentions, tho' those, he here Disputes with, are not bound to assign it? If we be in pursuit of a Man, who is gone to such a place, and we know there are Five ways, that lead thither, though he be not gone any of the Four first, yet it will not follow that he is gone the Fifth, because perhaps there may be some other unknown way, that he may either find, or make to the same place.

In the beginning of the 6th. Chap. pa. 108. He premises these two things. 1st. *That God has in himself the Ideas of all things:* This I shall not deny, but yet if I had a mind to set up for new Notions, I might take the hint from Mr. Norris, pa. 184. *Of Reason and Religion.* And argue thus, the truth and perfection of Reason is in God tho' not in that formality, as it is in Man; this gradual proceeding from one thing to another which is that we properly call reasoning, being rather a defect incident to created capacities; so God in like manner perfectly knows, and comprehends all things, but to see, and know 'em by

by Ideas, this is an imperfect way of seeing, and knowing things, proper only to Man, and created Intelligences : But now God sees and knows all things by an infinite, more perfect way, than by Ideas, in a way more suitable to the purity, and simplicity of the Divine Nature, so that when we say that God sees, and knows things by Ideas, this is only an humane mode of Knowledge, by way of accommodation applyed to God : But I shall leave these novell notions, to those who take more pleasure in them.

But suppose, we grant Ideas in God, it will not thence follow that we come to the knowledge of all things by viewing their Ideas in him.

His 2d. Postulatum is this.

THAT God is intimately by his presence united to our minds; that God is present with our Souls, as he is with all things else, is certainly true, but then I hope, he will not hence infer, or here assert such an union betwixt God and our Souls, as neither Reason nor Religion will allow. God may be said to be the place of Spirits, as Space is the place of Bodies, and yet without any such close, and strict union,

union, as he supposes. *Fanaticks* in the late times used to say, that they were Goded with God, and Christed with Christ, but far be it from me to think that *Monsieur Malbr.* Entertains any such opinion: But the mere presentialness of God to our minds, has no necessary influence upon our seeing all things in him, independently upon his Will, and this *Monsieur Malebr.* himself asserts, when he tells us, that the Mind can see all things in God, *dummodo deus velit ipsi retgere id quod in se habet quod representet illa opera.* pa. 209. According to those Men, who assert God only to be *Virtually* present every where, that is, by his power, and providence, yet according to this *Hypothesis*, tho' it be a very false, and dangerous one, God might if he pleas'd thus represent all things to Mens minds, that is, by his power, and providence.

I

*I shall now briefly examine the Reasons,
upon which he founds his Opinion.*

I. **H**E Argues from the general *economy* of the Universe, wherein it appears that God never does that by difficult ways, which may be done by simple, and easy ones: But what if we should say, that the other way, and method of humane understanding is as plain, easie, and obvious, either in it self to be done, or for us to apprehend, as that of seeing all things immediatly in God, however I think the former tends as much to the Illustration of the power, wisdom, and providence of God, as the latter doth. But this maxim, that God always acts by the most simple, and easy methods, must be mannag'd with a great deal of prudence and piety, otherwise it may prove of very bad consequence: We must not fancy to our selves what are the most simple, and easy ways of doing things, and then by virtue of that
maxim

maxim. oblige God to act according to our foolish imaginations thus if we should argue, that it is the more easy, and simple way for the Earth to bring forth Fruit, and Herbs, as it did at first, without Cultivation; or that it had been a more easy, and simple way for God to have pardon'd Sin, without sending his Son into the World to dye for it, would any one think that there is any force in this way of Arguing?

That God can make known to us all things more immediatly by himself, every one grants; but then the question is, whether those reasons which *Monsieur Malbr.* hath exhibited to us be sufficient to convince any rational, and considerate Man, that this is the method, that God takes in this particular.

I shall only take notice further of one period of his upon this Subject wherein he shows a great deal of wavering, and uncertainty in his Notion. *pa. 209.*

Cum igitur deus possit per se omnia mentibus patefacere, volendo simpliciter ut videant id quod est inter ipsos, seu in medio ipsorum, hoc est, id quod in ipso est quod relationem habet ad illas res, quodque illas representat, verisimile non est, &c. 1. He is not here willing to call these things *Ideas*, but express em but by another large Periphrasis

riphrafis. 2. He knows not where to place 'em, whether in God, or in our selves. But to proceed,

The Second Reason he gives is, because this Hypothesis places the *minds of Men in the greatest dependance upon God imaginable, because thus we can see nothing but what God wills that we should see, and nothing but what God exhibits to us to be seen.*

We ought not indeed to entertain any Opinion that may lessen our just dependance upon God, but is it any ways inconsistent with our Christian dependance, to be fellow workers together with God in the ways of his own Appointment? May we not make use of second causes by the assistance of his Power, and in Obedience to his Will, and after all depend upon God for a Blessing, and all this without any violation of our dependance upon him? But he says, our *Minds cannot sufficiently depend upon God in all their Operations, if they are suppos'd to have all things which we distinctly perceive to be necessary to Action, or if they have the Ideas of all things present to them.* But must we have all things necessary for Action, if we have the Ideas of all things present to us? Is there nothing further requir'd for Action but only these? Does not the Soul depend upon God, as to its preservation in all

s Actions? And is there not requir'd in the soul the free determination of it self, though other requisites besides do concur? Without this, I know not how the liberty of the Will can be secur'd.

3. He further argues from the manner of our Mind perceiving all things, *for we all find by certain experience, that when we are intended to think upon any particular thing, we first cast our Eyes about upon all Beings, and then at last fix upon the Object which we intended to think upon*; but perhaps all Men do not find by experience that this is the way and method they take in their respective Meditations, I rather think, that when Men intend to fix their thoughts upon such a particular Object, that the previous roving of their Minds is confin'd within a much narrower compass, and is not of such an universal extent.

But he says, *'tis past all question, that we cannot desire to see any Object, but we must see or know it already, though in a more confus'd and general way*; and the ground of this I suppose is, *Ignoti nulla cupido*, or something to that purpose, but here I would propound it to Consideration, whether Mr. Malbranch, though he be a severe Enemy to the Scholastick way, yet whether he does not suffer himself to be too much impos'd upon

upon by that Maxim of theirs, before it has undergone a just and due Examination.

But he says all Beings cannot be any *other ways present to the mind, but because God is present to it, who in the simplicity of his being comprehends all things.* Neither will Gods presentialness with our Minds prove that all Objects are so present to us, as to be known by us either distinctly or confusedly, unless God be willing to display 'em to us.

Here it may be further enquir'd, whether we may not be said to have a general or confus'd knowledge, even of the mysteries of our Religion, and of things above the reach and comprehension of human Reason, and if so, why may we not desire to have a further and clearer sight of 'em; now if we should desire to see these things, and God be not willing to represent 'em to us, then what becomes of that Union betwixt Man's Will, and God's representation of Ideas. *Pa. 21 . Ipse est, qui unione naturali, quam etiam instituit inter voluntatem hominis, & representationem idearum, ipsis notificat omnia, &c.* But I must confess, that I did not think, that when Monsieur *Malbranch* first instituted a philosophical disquisition upon this Subject, that he design'd it to extend to things of a divine Nature, had he not likewise endeavour'd to reconcile his Opinion to Scripture.

His last Argument, he says may pass for a demonstration with those who are us'd to abstracted Ratiocinations; tis this, *Impossibile est, Deum in suis actionibus alium habere finem principalem à seipso diversum; necesse igitur est, ut cognitio & lux, quam menti impertitur, aliquid nobis patefaciat, quod in ipso sit.* It is impossible that God in any of his Actions should have any principal end different from himself. It is necessary therefore that that Knowledge and Light which he bestows upon our mind should open, and exhibit to us something, that is in himself. *Quicquid enim ex deo venit propter aliud fieri non potest, quam propter deum;* for whatsoever comes from God, cannot be for any other besides God. These are his words so far as concerns the present Subject, but now they are so far from having the force of a Demonstration, that they seem not to have the face of a tolerable good Argument, viz. to prove, as he there design'd, that we see all things in God; for if God in all his Actions has not any principal end different from himself, all that can necessarily follow from hence is, that in this particular Action, of his bestowing Light and Knowledge upon our Minds, he had no other principal end different from himself; this I easily grant, may
not

not God make his own Glory the end of his giving us this natural Light, though we do not in his Sence thereby see all things in God? Or doth not that Light and Knowledge which God imparts to the Mind, discover to us those divine Attributes which are in God, and therefore not different from God himself? But perhaps it is my unacquaintedness with the abstracted ways of reasoning, that renders me incapable of understanding the force of the Demonstration.

Mr. Norris speaking upon this Subject, *viz.* of seeing and knowing all things in God, Pa. 206. *Of Reason and Religion*, says this *very Notion* Aquinas *had once plainly hit upon, however he came afterwards to loose it.* But I do not know that he ever lost that Notion he there hit upon, that Opinion which he here asserts, being the general opinion of the Schools in this particular; for says he in express terms, Pa. 1. Q. 84. 5. It is necessary to say, *that the human Soul knows all things in their eternal Reasons, by the participation of which we know all things, for that intellectual Light which is in us, is nothing else but a participated similitude of that increated Light, in which the eternal Reasons are contain'd.* Now I do not see that this is any acknowledgment at all,

all, of our seeing all things in God in that way that Monsieur *Malbranch* and Mr. *Norris* explains it, that the Soul knows all things, that is, universals (wherin *Aristot.* did assert all Science, truly so call'd, to consist) these things we know in their eternal Reasons; but he adds, *by the participation of which we know all things*, so that we do not see them under that formality as they are in God, but as by participation these eternal Reasons are deriv'd to us; for that intellectual Light that is in us, is nothing but a participated similitude of that increased Light in which the eternal Reasons are contain'd, that is, originally in God, but derivatively, or by way of participation in us, so that I am perfectly of *Aquinas's* Opinion according to this Interpretation, which whether it be more true in it self, or more likely to be *Aquinas's* meaning, is left to the Reader to judge.

But if this Opinion of Monsieur *Malbranch* be a truth, it has the least appearance of Truth of any in the whole World; all our outward Senses give Testimony against it, and our inward faculties do not in the least seem to favour it; we compare Ideas, and discourse, and draw consequences from former Premises, just according to the methods of the other Hypothesis; but if it be said, that

that after the use of all these means, that notwithstanding we see and know all things in God, one might be almost perswaded to think, that either God would have made these means (under the superintendence of his own Providence) effectual to those ends they seem at least design'd for, or else to use his own way of arguing, would have made use of that more easie and simple way which he might have done, by exhibiting or producing the knowledge of these things more immediately by himself, without the concurrence of these outward means, which are indeed nothing but useless and ineffectual Conditions.

Lastly, As for the Scriptures he urges in favour of his Opinion, I think they do not prove what they were intended for, *that all our knowledge is from God, that he is the Father of Lights, and teaches Man Wisdom, that Christ is the true Light that enlightens every one, &c.* No Body here denies this, but the dispute is not so much about the thing it self, as the manner of it, that is, whether all the Knowledge we arrive at here in this World, be only by seeing all things in God according to his Hypothesis, Monsieur Malbranch thought perhaps it would be some advantage to his cause, if he could procure it some countenance from

Scrip-

Scripture, but when his quotations are so little to the purpose, they serve only to create prejudices against it; thus others are apt to believe there is but little strength in the cause, when Men are forc'd to use such inconclusive Arguments in the defence of it.

Nor, do I think that those brought by Mr. Norris amount to any necessary Proof, St. John, he says, calls Christ the true Light, that is, *the only Light*, but may not other subordinate Lights be also true Lights? Is not the light of a Candle a true Light, tho' it be inferiour to that of the Sun? But however it will not hence follow, but that this *only true Light* may have several ways and methods of giving light to the World, besides that of seeing all things in God, &c. He cites also, Jo. 17. 17. *Sanctifie them by thy Truth, thy word is Truth, which is not he says, meant of the written word, but of the substantial and eternal word, as appears from the Context*; but I do not see how any Argument can be drawn from that place, unless it be from the word *λόγος*, which yet doth not always signify the substantial and eternal word of God, but sometimes the preaching of the Gospel, as appears from the 20th. Verse, for all those *who shall believe in me through their word* διὰ λόγου αὐτῶν, by the preaching of the Gospel, Lastly,
The

The Apostle says expressly, 1 Cor. i. 30. of this divine Word, *that he is made unto us Wisdom, which is exactly according to our Hypothesis, that we see all things in the ideal World, or divine $\alpha\gamma\omega\gamma\epsilon$.* Pa. 222. of *Reason and Religion*; but in answer to this, 1. By Wisdom is not here meant natural, but divine and evangelical Wisdom. 2. The Apostle there speaks of Christ Jesus, of Christ more especially, as he is made known to us by the Gospel, for he is there said to be made to us Righteousness, Sanctification, and Redemption, as well as Wisdom, but I suppose he will not say, that we see our Sanctification or Redemption, that is, the ways and methods of these, in the $\alpha\gamma\omega\gamma\epsilon$, or Ideal World, or any other ways than as they are reveal'd to us in Scripture. 3. May not Christ be made to us Wisdom, unless we see all things in the *Ideal World*? I shall here only further observe what *Theophylact* says upon this place, $\tau\alpha \zeta\omega\sigma\epsilon\iota\varsigma$, &c. *non dixit, sapientes nos fecit, sed factus est nobis sapientia; doni largitatem sc. ostendens, perinde ac si dicat, seipsum nobis tradidit.*

I have now finish'd those short Remarks upon those two Subjects, *viz. the law of Fashion and innate Notions*, not only in answer to Mr. *Lock*, but to some other Learned Persons also, who seem to favour his
Opini-

Opinion in the second particular; and now if any expression herein seems too harsh, or not becoming the Character of such great and learned Men (though I hope there is not) yet if there be any such, I do hereby wholly recall it. I hope we are all pursuing the same general design, *viz.* the search of Truth, and if so, then the detection of any error will but be the promoting of the same common end we all aim at, for my part, I shall think it so, as to my self.

I would not have Mr. *Lock* think, that pa. 88. I do there in the least insinuate, that he held the materiality of God, or that I went about to draw him into a Controversie, wherein he is nothing concern'd. I do freely grant, that he asserts the spirituality of the divine Essence in the most strict and proper Sense of it. I was once in hopes that he was convinc'd of the *Certainty* of the Souls Immateriality too, by what he said pa. 5th. of his Answer to some remarks, added to his reply, to the Learned Bishop of *Worcester*, but what his Opinion herein is at present, I know not.

I shall here only propound these two things to Mr. *Lock's* serious Consideration,
 1. Whether asserting the immateriality of the Soul be not a good Fence or stop against the inlet of that dangerous Opinion of the
 mate-

materiality of the divine Essence. 2. Whether it be worthy of a Christian Philosopher to make a bare possibility the ground of his asserting things of this Nature, for I think, he is very unfortunate in his choice, who happens upon such an Opinion in Philosophy, that it is not possible for Omnipotence to make good.

I shall not here enter into that dispute, whether *Tully* held the Soul to be material or immaterial, yet this I think must be granted by all, who attentively read, and impartially consider his 1st. Tusculan Question, that whatever nature he held the Soul to be of, he makes God to be the same: But it is not so much to the purpose, to consider what Opinions the Heathen Philosophers entertain'd in things of this Nature, as what is worthy of a Christian Philosopher to think of 'em.

F I N I S.

ERRATA.

PAge 5, Line the last, for hunc read huic, p. 12, Line 7, for appeal, r. appeal'd, p. 15, l. 2. for watsoever, r. whatsoever, p. 20, l. 19, for concidere, r. coincidere, p. 24, l. 13, for quit, r. quote, p. 27, r. mislled, p. 38, l. 15, for the, r. that, p. 39, l. 18, for measurer, r. measure, p. 41, plac: the Figure 199, 200, l. 22, in the l. above 21, p. 4, last line r. prevailing, p. 45 l. 22, read Men's, p. 48, l. 19, r. precede, p. 54, l. 1, r. separation, p. 62, l. 25, for moral, r. natural, p. 65, l. 4, r. God, l. 17, r. benignity, p. 69, l. 13, r. convenient, p. 72, l. 2 r. defendi possint, p. 77, l. 13, r. hankering, p. 85, l. 18, dele the second not, p. 88, l. 13, for made use of, r. carryed on, p. 8, l. 27, dele the first And, p. 90, l. 7, r. Epicurus's, p. 95, l. 14, after those, add, to, p. 98, l. 1, r. other, p. 114, l. 6, r. assert, p. 116, l. 22, r. ingenuous, p. 134, l. the last, r. external, p. 139, l. 5, r. as, p. 140, l. the last, r. virtutum, p. 141, l. 14, dele much, p. 154, l. 12, r. investigation, p. 158, l. 10, r. very, p. 160, l. 24, r. ante diluvian.



